贝德：中美应避免陷入冷战（双语）

作者：贝德  来源：中美印象

【编者按：8月13日，约翰•桑顿中国中心（The John L. Thornton China Center）组织了一场关于美中关系挑战的虚拟对话。参加会议的有布鲁金斯高级管理人员、桑顿中心学者和布鲁金斯中国理事会成员。中国驻美国大使崔天凯致辞并回答提问。作为会议的一部分，布鲁金斯高级研究员杰弗里•贝德（Jeffrey Bader）就双边关系中的主要挑战发表了评论。他认为，中国应当开启一场对话，而不是继续打嘴仗。杰弗里·贝德现任美国布鲁金斯学会的资深研究员。贝德曾在2009年至2011年期间任奥巴马政府的国家安全委员会总统特别助理，并担任奥巴马总统在亚洲事务方面的高级顾问。2005年至2009年间，贝德先是担任布鲁金斯中国计划的主任，并在之后出任更名后新成立的布鲁金斯学会约翰·桑顿中国中心的首任主任。本文由《中美印象》的实习记者王煜楠翻译，汤杰校对。汤杰为复旦大学国际关系与公共事务学院博士生。】

With the November presidential election looming, many China watchers are focused on what the outcome could mean for relations between Washington and Beijing. That question is no doubt a crucial one. At the same time, many trends in that all-important relationship are of course longer-term than one presidential administration. What are the long-term prospects for U.S.-China relations at this stage?
    11月的总统大选日益临近，许多中国问题观察家都在关注着，华盛顿和北京之间的关系最终会走向何方。无疑，这一问题是关键的。同时，对于这对极为重要的双边关系来说，很多问题是不大可能在一届总统任期内解决的。那么长期来看，中美关系的前景何在？

The differences between the United States and China on political, economic, ideological, technological, and security issues are real. They can and must be managed through dialogue, but we can’t pretend that we simply have a communications problem. Both sides know better. The basic framework for the relationship going forward is likely to be strategic competition, with cooperation in discrete areas, hopefully covering many subjects. There could instead be strategic rivalry, which would be more adversarial and require cool heads to manage disputes. Or the relationship could degenerate into a cold war, which would be in the interest of neither the United States nor China.
    中美之间在政治、经济、意识形态、科技和国家安全上的差异与矛盾是真切存在的，他们能够，也必须，通过对话来解决，但我们也不能够掩耳盗铃地说两国之间的问题仅仅只是沟通问题。在这一点上，双方都很清楚。双边关系的基本定位可能是战略竞争对手（strategic competitor），在个别领域存在合作，合作多多益善。相反，双边关系也可能是战略竞争对头（strategic rivalry），这样双方将更加敌对，需要冷静的头脑来把控争端。双边关系也可能恶化为一场冷战，这是美中两国都不愿看到的，既不符合美国也不符合中国的利益。

A U.S.-China cold war would not be like the U.S.-Soviet one, which was largely military and ideological. A cold war would begin with radical decoupling and disengagement, which regrettably we are already seeing. It would descend and expand from there. It would fracture the international community on issues on which there should otherwise be widespread cooperation. It would build walls between economies, scientists, scholars, and ordinary people. It would likely foment ethnic stereotyping, discrimination, and hatred. It would prevent two great civilizations from benefiting from each other’s strengths and contributions. It would exacerbate an arms race that would crowd out domestic priorities. Above all, it would increase the risk of military conflict, even if neither side desires it.
    中美间的冷战不会是美苏冷战那样的模式，美苏冷战主要是军事和意识形态上的对抗。中美间的冷战可能会以脱钩（decoupling）和脱轨（disengagement）为开端，很遗憾的是，我们已经见证了这些。事态将继续恶化并扩大，不会止步于此。这将令国际社会解体，在很多领域广泛存在的国际合作将烟消云散。在经济体、科学家、学者、普通民众之间，一道道墙拔地而起。民族成见，种族歧视，甚至民族仇恨，都在不断酝酿。两个伟大的文明不再从彼此的实力和贡献中受益。军备竞赛升级，国内其他更紧迫的问题都会被置诸脑后。总之，军事冲突的风险加剧，尽管双方都不愿如此。

How do we avoid such an outcome? There are fundamental questions the U.S. and China will need to answer.
    我们怎样避免这样的结局？有一些根本问题需要中美两国来回答。

For the United States: Is it willing to accept a peer competitor, particularly one with a different political system and ideology? In principle, the answer should be yes, but there is an action/reaction mechanism in U.S. politics. An administration that fully accepts China as a peer inevitably will have to endure and beat back harsh attacks from a nationalist opposition. So it will require long-term steadiness, not a one-off decision. The United States can sustain such a view if China accommodates to the traditional stabilizing role of the United States in East Asia rather than seeking to undermine it.
    对美国来说：是否愿意接受一个同等地位的竞争者？尤其是，这位竞争者有着不同的政治体制和意识形态。原则上，答案应该是肯定的，但是美国政治中有一个作用/反应机制（action/reaction mechanism）。即如果一届政府全盘接受了中国的存在，那么不可避免地将经受民族主义反对派的打击与拷问。这需要长期的稳步前行，而不是一时的心血来潮。美国接受这一场景的前提是，中国能在东亚继续配合美国充当一个传统的稳定的角色，而不试图颠覆现有的格局。

For China: Can it comfortably integrate and assimilate into a rules-based international order created and historically dominated by the United States, and characterized by certain norms, such as on trade, protection of intellectual property rights, privacy, digital freedoms, rule of law, due process, transparency, law of the sea, and human rights? (I would add that it is essential that the U.S. failure to show traditional respect for the rules-based international system over the last several years must be corrected, as well.)
    对中国来说：能否心甘情愿地融入由美国创造并主宰的国际秩序？国际秩序规范中囊括了贸易、专利权的保护、隐私权、数字自由（digital freedom）、法治、正当法律程序（due process）、透明度的要求、海洋法以及人权。（当然需要补充一点，过去几年，美国自己没能对国际体系规则保持一贯的尊重，这是需要纠正的）

Can China adjust to these norms, or will it simply demand that its national system be respected? Can China find ways to ensure that its activities in international affairs are consistent with these norms, or at least do not undercut them, while maintaining its own political, economic, and social system?
    中国能适应这些规范吗？还是说，只是简单地强调自己的举国体制应当被尊重？中国能否找到途径，保证在国际事务上的行为符合国际规范？或者，在维持自身政治、经济和社会体制的同时，能否做到至少不去破坏这些国际规范？

A lesson of the past few years is that, in a globalized world, it is difficult for the international system to function well if there is a large gap in attitudes and practices among major countries regarding these norms.
    过去几年的教训是：在一个全球化的世界，在对待国际规范这样的问题上，如果主要国家之间在态度上和实践上存在较大出入，那么国际体系很难正常运行。

China made the fundamental decision 40 years ago to join the international system, from which it has derived great benefits and to which it has made important contributions. But the world’s accommodation of China’s unorthodox practices when it was a relatively minor player is a different matter entirely. Today, China has become a dominant actor. China, along with the United States, is now an elephant in the canoe. The elephants have to be careful, or they can swamp the canoe and everyone in it.

    中国能适应这些规范吗？还是说，只是简单地强调自己的举国体制应当被尊重？中国能否找到途径，保证在国际事务上的行为符合国际规范？或者，在维持自身政治、经济和社会体制的同时，能否做到至少不去破坏这些国际规范？

For understandable historical reasons, China is especially fierce in safeguarding its sovereignty and asserting the sovereignty of nations and non-interference as the foundational principles of international norms. No more than the United States can China be expected to renounce that position. But China will need to do more than invoke its sovereignty under Westphalian principles if it is to be a leader in the international system and enjoy its full benefits. The country has not yet completed the journey it began in 1978 toward full integration into the international rules-based system. For example, it needs to accept the full obligations of developed countries in the World Trade Organization, open its internet and level the information technology sector playing field for foreign participation on a reciprocal basis, and provide complete transparency to the World Health Organization and international health experts.
    基于可以理解的历史原因，在维护主权问题上，中国是尤为狂热的。中国将国家主权不得干预视为国际规范的根本原则。仅仅是美国，不会使中国放弃这一立场。但是，中国如果想成为国际体系的领导者，那么仅仅乐此不疲地援引威斯特伐利亚体系下的主权原则，是远远不够的。中国还没完成自1978年以来所开启的融入国际规则体系之旅。比如，世贸组织所规定的有关发达国家的全部义务，中国都应当履行；开放互联网；基于对等的基础，为国外同行提供信息技术领域的公平竞争环境；对世卫组织及国际健康专家保持信息公开和透明。

It will need to lead by example. It will be hard for China to make such changes. The United States can provide an example, and serve its own interests, by showing that it intends to adhere to the rules-based system that it played the key role in creating.
中国需以身作则。当然，让中国做出上述这些改变是困难的。在美国自己参与创建的国际体系中，美国应当遵守国际规范，既服务于自身利益，也为中国展现一个模范的样板。

【中美印象首发；2020年9月3日；转发请注明出处。】

来源时间：2020/9/3   发布时间：2020/9/3

旧文章ID：22863