李侃如：把北京带回来
作者：李侃如 来源：布鲁金斯学会
美国的亚洲再平衡战略已收到如期效果，但目前战略却可能引发与中国的冲突。布鲁金斯研究所的克林顿时期中国事务总统顾问李侃如(Kenneth G.Lieberthal)向奥巴马呈递备忘，作为总统简报《大赌注与黑天鹅》(Big Bets and Black Swans)的一部分。其要点如下：
奥巴马总统为稳固中美两国双边关系应采取怎样的措施?
美方应对新领导人习近平有何期待?
习会对美方的参与合作尝试有何反应?奥巴马应向习表明哪些政策立场?
全文如下：
您针对亚洲的再平衡战略已收到如期效果，包括让中国相信美国说自己有能力和决心长期在该地区扮演领导者角色并非戏言。但这一策略同样也在导致其他问题，并威胁和弱化其基本目标。因此，现在正是审慎地再次评估再平衡战略的时候，中国领导人换届正为您提供了这一契机。
您的目标应该是确保亚洲在下一个五到十年内为世界及美国经济的繁荣做出实质贡献，减少那些既耗费美国财力又削弱该地区经济活力的安全困境。
不幸的是，目前您的战略反而恰恰在增大不良安全的后果。显而易见，中日领土争端变得越发尖锐，北京错误地假设争端四起即意味着美方在战略上怂恿日本、越南和菲律宾群岛越过底线激怒中国，从而让这些国家——及东南亚国家联盟——更团结也更依赖美国，并按照这种假设进行运作。
我们的积极参与正促使该地区各国对我们夹道欢迎，这在短期来看令人满意，但从长远的角度看会对美国产生威胁。美国的朋友和盟友一边鼓励美国加大安全承诺，一边也同样把自己的经济未来与中国的增长绑在一起。美国因此很有可能把亚洲变成中国更大的利润中心(通过经济和贸易纽带)，同时也变成美国主要的开销中心(通过安全承诺)，特别是在泛太平洋伙伴关系(TPP)不奏效的情况下则更是如此。
建议：
为改变这一趋势，您应该在今年春季主动采取措施稳固与中方的双边关系，同时不断在该地区加强力量，让自己的盟友安心。亚洲没有哪个国家愿意在中美两国中择其一，也再没有哪个国家会害怕两国集团的出现。所有国家都在寻求一种“睿智管理”式的中美关系。因此，一种能促进中美关系并促进区域稳定的措施就可能会增强美国在整个亚洲的地位。
背景：
中国领导人换届带来了机会。中国人目前更爱发声，更会挑剔也更加民族主义，习近平担心自己如果处不好和人民的关系，就会面临对中国制度的严重挑战。习近平必须下力气改变这种使社会政治愈发不安的发展模式，即使这样会使发展速度放缓。
早先的猜测认为习近平比胡锦涛更开放，政治上也更灵活，但其变革的特别方式和能力尚不为人所知。他可能会在区域问题上采取强硬立场以表明中国的决心，也可能会欢迎压低国际紧张态势的机会，从而更专注地处理国内转型问题。您应当为其提供明确选择，让他采取后一种策略。
您应当特别为习提供一种改变游戏(game changing)的机会，把中美关系放在一种更可预测的、长远的立足点上，既要保护中国关键利益，也要在关键的双边、区域和国际问题上更加深入地参与其中。但凡任何一种能使中国行为大有起色的美国政策都会在整个亚洲受到欢迎。
北京的官僚作派无法使其主动提出如下我所推荐的观点。习就是想让美国先出牌再考虑如何反应——然后真正的谈判才能开始。因此，您必须提出最初的议事日程。
该策略就是向习提供绝对善意的努力，帮其处理刺激性因素，前提是中国在如下美国所关注的关键领域里同您的政府合作。您可以做出一些重要的事来改变中国对美国意图的估测，同时推进美国的特殊利益。
我建议您尽早同习接触，与其建立亲近的个人关系，并利用这种关系提出一项四年中美关系框架，该框架将为今后10到20年提供坚实的信任基础，同时也为中国高唱的“新型大国关系”之歌提供内容，同时建议每年至少与他举行四次半天的峰会——不是那种一个小时的双边峰会，而是在多边活动峰会期间与他单独相见。实质上，您还可以考虑提出如下几点：
现行的战略经济对话(S&ED)在结构上就对中国来说非常奇怪，且从未给经济和外交领域带来持久对话。请提议将其重新组装成持久的(而不是一年简短地开一次会的)政治军事对话，同时建立独立的经济对话机制，如同前财政部长保尔森所主导的战略性经济对话。
就政治/军事对话而言，提议建立战略安全对话(Sstrategic Security Dialogue)，每年召开四次全天会议，双方需有各自的工作小组保持正常联系。在战略经济对话框架下简短召开的两次战略安全对话是唯一让双方军事和外交政策专家们共处一室的正式中美对话。在四次战略安全加强对话中，应有至少有两次对话专门讨论十年内美中在亚洲的大体态势——包括基本想法、指导思想、核心考虑/利益、及那些相互制约能带来双边利益的领域。美国从未与中国进行过这种讨论，这对于建立战略性信任来说可能至关重要。
中美军军关系大大落后于民民关系，您请提出一些措施以缓解这一问题。中国人民解放军认为美国限制邀请其参加军事演习说明美国对中国有敌意。您可以暗示动用豁免权来允许解放军参与日后由美国组织的军事演习(国防部长帕内塔已在2013环太军演中这样做过)。您也可以在军事合作方面与中方讨论如何保价格合理的石油更好地运出波斯湾。
相关方面，海洋领土争端正使中国对美国在该地区的战略越发警觉。您可就此可信地澄清我们的原则，以减轻中方疑虑。您的声明应当澄清：美国在与自己无关的领土争端中将不会对主权问题奉行任何立场;美国支持东盟在行为准则(Code of Conduct)下集体与中国谈判，以减少领土争端升级的可能，但不主张中国就领土争端与所有东南亚国家进行谈判;同时美国会坚持其和平解决争端、航海自由(包括经济专属区)、及美国和其他国家以商业目的公司正常获取海洋资源等核心原则。
您可提出其他措施促进经济合作。比如说，这些措施可以包括深化中美双方投资条约的谈判;邀请中国在自己有能力的时候参与到跨太平洋伙伴关系中来;完成长达数年的出口政策审核，这样既帮助了美国企业，也消解了中美经济关系中严重的刺激性因素;引导商务部和美国贸易代表展开协商分支，帮助中国公司理解美国相关投资法案法规;并指出美国愿意在清洁能源部长级会议上与中方合作，发展出帮助主要排放国增强处理气候变化能力的合作方式。
以上是您与习近平接洽的内容与范围的要点，您还可以暗示如果习也能在以下问题上做出同等程度的努力，美国愿意将以下几点双边协商的一揽子内容：
`缓解海洋领土争端紧张局势
`进一步深化中美军事合作，深化亚洲长期战略姿态的讨论
`朝鲜核项目和导弹项目
`向美国开放中国经济其他领域(特别是服务行业)
`加强个人知识产权保护，积极应对网络安全威胁
`气候变化问题上的联合举措
结论：
习可能无法也不愿积极回应您的要求。但尽早提出这种大范围的举措并不会带来多少损失，因为您要寻求的是相互协商，而不是美方的单边行动。这样做的回报可能会非常大，中美双方都会改变自己的行为，使我们的整体再调整战略转化成长期的、惠及整个地区的成功。
Kenneth Lieberthal: MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT | January 17, 2013
Bringing Beijing Back In
The U.S. rebalancing strategy (pivot) toward Asia has produced desirable results, but the current strategy could increase security conflicts with China. Kenneth Lieberthal drafted this memorandum to President Obama as part of Big Bets and Black Swans: A Presidential Briefing Book.
· What steps can President Obama take to solidify and strengthen America’s bilateral relationship with China?
· What should the U.S. expect from Xi Jinping as a leader?
· How could Xi react to U.S. efforts to engage and cooperate? What policy positions should President Obama make explicit to Xi?
Download Memorandum (pdf) | Download the Presidential Briefing Book (pdf)
TO: President Obama
FROM: Kenneth G. Lieberthal
Your rebalancing strategy toward Asia has produced desirable results, including convincing China that the United States is serious, capable and determined to be a leader in the region for the long term. But this strategy is also generating dynamics that increasingly threaten to undermine its primary goals. It is therefore time to rebalance judiciously the rebalancing strategy, and China’s leadership change provides you with an opportunity to do so.
Your objective should remain an Asia that, five-to-10 years from now, will contribute substantially to global and U.S. economic growth and will mitigate security dilemmas that drain American treasure and reduce the region’s economic dynamism.
Unfortunately, at this point your current strategy is in danger of actually enhancing rather than reducing bad security outcomes. Most notably, territorial disputes have become sharper, and Beijing is largely operating under the false assumption that the flare-up of these disputes reflects an underlying U.S. strategy to encourage Japan, Vietnam, and the Philippines to push the envelope in the hope that Chinese responses will lead those countries — and ASEAN — to become more united and dependent on the United States.
Welcome mats for our increased security engagement are now being laid out around the region. This is satisfying in the short term but carries longerterm risks. U.S. friends and allies are encouraging the United States to enhance its security commitments, but they are also tying their economic futures to China’s growth. The United States is thus in danger of having Asia become an ever greater profit center for China (via economic and trade ties) and a major cost center for the United States (via security commitments), especially if the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) does not develop as hoped.
Recommendation:
To shift this trajectory, you should take the initiative this spring to solidify and strengthen the core bilateral relationship with China while continuing to provide reassurances to allies and partners of U.S. staying power in the region. Nobody in Asia wants to have to take sides between the United States and China, and none any longer fear a G-2. All seek “wise management” of U.S.-China relations. An initiative that improves U.S.-China relations and contributes to regional stability can, therefore, potentially enhance U.S. position throughout Asia.
Background:
China’s leadership change presents an opportunity. Xi Jinping fears serious challenges to the Chinese system if he cannot improve relations with a population that has become increasingly vocal, critical and nationalistic. Xi knows he must significantly alter a development model that is exacerbating social and political tensions, even as the rate of growth slows.
Early indications are that Xi is more open and politically agile than was Hu Jintao, but his specific priorities and capacity to effect change are not yet known. He may take a strong stance on regional issues to signal China’s determination or he may welcome a chance to tamp down international tensions to focus more on domestic transformation. You should give him a clear option to pursue the latter approach.
Specifically, you should offer Xi a game-changing opportunity to put U.S.- China relations on a more predictable long-term footing that protects critical Chinese equities but also requires that China engage more positively on key bilateral, regional and global issues. Any U.S. policy that moves the needle on China’s behavior will be welcome throughout Asia.
Beijing is bureaucratically incapable of taking the initiative to suggest the ideas recommended below. Xi will want the United States to put cards on the table to which he can then respond — and then the real negotiation will begin. That lets you shape the opening agenda.
The strategy is to offer Xi full good-faith efforts to deal with key irritants, provided China works with your administration on the areas of major U.S. concern indicated below. You can do important things to change Beijing’s calculus of American intentions while also advancing specific U.S. interests.
I recommend that you engage with Xi Jinping early on in order to establish a strong personal relationship with him. Use this to propose working out a four-year framework for U.S.-China relations that establishes a solid foundation of trust for the next one-to-two decades and provides substance to China’s mantra of “a new type of major power relationship.” Suggest that at least four times per year you and he hold half-day summits – not onehour bilaterals — on the margins of multilateral events. Substantively, you might raise the following for consideration:
The current Strategic & Economic Dialog (S&ED) is structurally very awkward for China and has never produced a sustained dialogue across the economic and foreign policy spheres. Propose that it be repackaged into a political and military (pol/mil) dialogue that is sustained (rather than a brief annual meeting) and a separate economic dialogue that closely parallels the Strategic Economic Dialogue that former Treasury Secretary Paulson led.
For the pol/mil dialogue, suggest an enhanced Strategic Security Dialogue (SSD) that convenes four day-long meetings a year, with each side establishing a working group for ongoing liaison. The Strategic Security Dialogue, which met briefly twice under the S&ED, is the only formal U.S.-China dialogue that brings together military and foreign policy leaders in the same room. At least two of the enhanced SSD meetings should exclusively address overall U.S. and Chinese security postures in Asia a decade hence – basic thinking, pertinent doctrine, core concerns/interests, and areas where mutual restraint may benefit both sides. The United States has never held such discussions with China, and they may be critical for building strategic trust.
U.S.-China military-to-military (mil-mil) relations lag far behind those of their civilian counterparts. Suggest several initiatives to relieve some of the strain in that sphere. The PLA sees restrictions on inviting them to military exercises as indicative of hostile U.S. expectations of the relationship. You can indicate the possibility you will use your waiver authority to permit PLA participation in various future U.S.- organized military exercises (Defense Secretary Panetta has already done this for RIMPAC 2013). You might also offer serious discussions on military cooperation to assure better the ongoing flow of reasonably-priced oil from the Persian Gulf.
Relatedly, maritime territorial disputes are feeding China’s wariness about U.S. strategy in the region. You can offer to clarify authoritatively our principles to reduce Chinese suspicions. Such clarification would make clear that: The United States will take no position on sovereignty in territorial disputes to which it is not a party; the United States supports an ASEAN collective negotiation with China on a Code of Conduct in order to reduce the potential for territorial disputes to escalate, but does not seek Chinese negotiation with all of ASEAN on resolving territorial disputes; and the United States will adhere to its core principles of peaceful management of disputes, freedom of navigation (including in Exclusive Economic Zones), and normal commercial access for American and other firms to maritime resources.
You can suggest various initiatives to enhance economic cooperation. These might include, for example, intensifying negotiations for a U.S.- China Bilateral Investment Treaty; inviting China to engage on the TPP when Beijing feels it is able to do so; completing the years-long technology export policy review, which can help U.S. business while also removing serious irritants in U.S.-China economic relations; directing the Department of Commerce and the U.S. Trade Representative to establish a consultative arm to help Chinese firms understand the pertinent U.S. investment laws and regulations; and indicating U.S. interest in working with China at the Clean Energy Ministerial to develop cooperative ways for major emitters to improve their capacity to deal with climate change.
The above highlights the scope and some of the content of what you might indicate to Xi that you are prepared to move forward on as a package, if Xi will put together a comparable level of efforts on the following issues:
? Mitigation of tensions over maritime territorial disputes
? More extensive U.S.-China mil-mil engagement and discussion of longterm strategic postures in Asia
? North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs
? Opening additional areas of the Chinese economy (especially in the service sector) to American investment
? Strengthening enforcement of intellectual property protections and engaging on cyber-security threats
? Joint initiatives on climate change
Conclusion:
Xi may be unable or unwilling to respond significantly to your offer. But taking this wide-ranging initiative early on costs little or nothing, since you would be seeking to begin a reciprocal negotiation, not to commit the United States to unilateral actions. The payoff is potentially very large in reshaping Chinese and American behavior in ways that will make our overall rebalancing strategy a long-term region-wide success.
来源时间：2013/1/21 发布时间：2013/1/21
旧文章ID：118
