阎学通：中国为何不惧怕特朗普
中国知名国际关系学者阎学通2024年12月20日在美国《外交事务》撰文指出，中国并不惧怕特朗普。特朗普再执政，中美关系紧张局势可能加剧，但特朗普的孤立主义倾向将帮助北京。美中之间不太可能在特朗普第二任内爆发冷战或热战。本文由《中评网》余东晖编译。
文章开篇指出，多年来，特朗普一直猛烈抨击中国，将美国各种弊病的根源归于中国。在特朗普准备开始第二个任期之际，他的言论和内阁任命表明，他将加倍推行对华强硬路线。两国之间不稳定的关系将变得更加不稳定。
然而，阎学通认为，中方并不惧怕特朗普。他们从特朗普的第一个任期中学到了很多东西。特朗普的经济保护主义倾向将导致进一步的争端和紧张局势的加剧，但北京相信它可以驾驭这种对抗。此外，特朗普对美国盟友的可疑承诺将鼓励其他国家两面下注，与北京建立联系以抵消华盛顿的不可预测性。
阎学通还认为，中国与美国发生军事冲突的可能性也很低。由于特朗普的外交政策从未表现出任何深刻的意识形态承诺，两国之间的竞争似乎不太可能呈现出冷战更具破坏性的层面。特朗普不想卷入战争，更愿意专注于国内改革。他很快就会带着遏制中国的意图入主白宫，但中国领导人并不害怕他的回归。
阎学通表示，北京并不认为，2024年美国总统大选的结果对美国对华政策的总体走向有太大影响。无论谁入主白宫，美国下一任总统都将得到两党共识的支持，即认为中国对美国的全球主导地位构成威胁，并将继续试图遏制中国。
阎学通指出，特朗普的第二任与其第一任会有所不同。特朗普任命了右翼极端分子担任重要的外交政策和国家安全职位，其中一些人不到50岁。许多人是在中国在全球舞台上迅速崛起的时期成长起来的。他们将中国视为美国的主要威胁，并主张采取更极端、更具强制性的政策来压制中国的进步。
不过，阎学通认为，过去8年来，北京更善于管理与华盛顿的竞争。北京方面应对了奥巴马、特朗普和拜登政府的不同策略：奥巴马和拜登试图通过多边方式遏制中国，而特朗普则采取了更为单边主义的路线。有了这些经验，中方对特朗普再次当选的前景并不感到担忧。
中方近期频频通过各种平台和渠道向特朗普第二任政府释放讯息：致力于中美关系稳定、健康、可持续发展的目标没有变；按照相互尊重、和平共处、合作共赢处理中美关系的原则没有变；坚定维护自身主权、安全、发展利益的立场没有变；赓续中美人民传统友谊的愿望没有变。
阎学通的文章解释，北京将坚持“相互尊重、和平共处、合作共赢”作为处理中美关系的原则。“相互尊重”意味着中国将对特朗普采取的任何挑衅行动予以反制； “和平共处”意味着中国将寻求与特朗普就管控分歧和冲突进行对话，以稳定双边关系；“合作共赢”是指中美两国在有共同利益的全球问题上开展合作，比如结束乌克兰战争、制定人工智能法规和指导方针、遏制非法毒品流动等。
阎学通指出，特朗普似乎有意在第二任期内推行经济保护主义，尤其是在对华问题上。他已表示可能进一步对中国产品加征关税，对美国在华投资和中国资本在美股市更多地设限，对技术合作施加更多限制，并减少在美留学生数量。这些决定必然会导致中美之间产生更多摩擦。
阎学通表示，特朗普在第二任期内可能会更加努力地推动更广泛的脱钩，并试图大幅减少中国产品在美国的市场份额。北京可能会采取报复措施。这种针锋相对的态势可能将两国之间酝酿已久的贸易战推向新的高峰，而许多其他国家也将纷纷效仿，采取各自的保护主义政策，从而给全球经济带来破坏性后果。
阎学通预期，随着特朗普挑起贸易战升级，其政府可能会加大对北京的军事压力。在面对对手时，特朗普经常采取霸凌和虚张声势的策略。当美国试图处理与北京的军事紧张关系时，尤其是在南海和台湾问题上，卢比奥和赫格塞斯等鹰派可能会助长特朗普虚张声势的倾向。通过好战的言论和冲动的行动，华盛顿可能会引发类似于2022年佩洛西访台之后的危机。
阎学通预计，特朗普的第二任期几乎肯定会对北京和华盛顿之间的官方对话产生寒蝉效应。特朗普可能会暂停拜登政府建立的近20个对华渠道，并用他直接监督的新渠道取而代之，而不是通过高级官僚。但中国在与特朗普接触时会极其谨慎。
阎学通认为，中美之间的敌意也可能在社会层面上加剧。民粹主义在两国都日益壮大，助长了沙文主义的火焰。如果特朗普坚持以经济手段打击中国的威胁，并采取更多武力威胁，两国之间由此产生的政治紧张局势将不可避免地加剧两国人民之间的敌对情绪。
尽管特朗普的第二任期可能会以经济和军事约束中国而加剧中美关系的紧张局势，但阎学通的文章分析，特朗普的实践可能会在几个方面使中国受益：
首先，特朗普对意识形态问题相对不感兴趣，这可能会软化中美对抗的一些尖锐问题。特朗普从未真正关心过人权问题，他无意改变中国的政治制度，不太可能热衷于干涉中国内政。在特朗普的第二任期内，北京和华盛顿之间的经济和战略冲突可能会加剧，但它们不会升级为让两国的意识形态直接冲突。
其次，与经济保护主义相对应，特朗普的政治孤立主义可能导致美国减少对保护传统盟友的投入。特朗普长期以来一直谴责美国盟友利用美国的实力和慷慨。这些抱怨可能会促使美国的欧洲和东亚盟友看到在中国和美国之间进行对冲的好处。
特朗普还将努力避免与中国发生公开冲突，无论他的言辞多么尖锐。“台湾独立”一直并仍将是美中摩擦的根源，但中美两国不太可能因台湾问题而开战。未来四年，北京的注意力将主要集中在重振经济上，不会制定统一台湾的时间表。特朗普则希望自己能成为历史上最伟大的美国总统之一。为此，他将专注于国内改革和国内经济，他不想冒着发生大国战争的风险，而卷入台湾问题。
阎学通说，那些预计美中将爆发冷战的人是错误的。美国与中国的竞争不是意识形态上的竞争，而是技术上的竞争。中国和美国将在人工智能等领域展开创新之争，争夺市场和高科技供应链。他们不会试图让其他人接受他们偏爱的执政意识形态。今天，大国之间的代理人冲突毫无意义。特朗普没有理由在台海或南海挑起针对中国的代理人战争。
最后阎学通表示，尽管特朗普的孤立主义无疑为北京改善与美国盟友的关系创造了机会，但国内改革才是真正决定两大国竞争走向的因素。目前，中国领导人和特朗普团队都更关注国内事务而非外交事务。如果中国领导人在未来四年内比特朗普更好地实施改革，中国将缩小与美国的实力差距。
Why China Isn’t Scared of Trump U.S.-Chinese Tensions May Rise, but His Isolationism Will Help Beijing
by Yan Xuetong
Foreign Affairs
December 20, 2024
China’s leaders, however, do not look at Trump with fear. They learned a great deal from his first term. His propensity for economic protectionism will lead to further disputes and rising tensions, but Beijing believes that it can navigate such confrontations. Moreover, Trump’s dubious commitment to U.S. allies will encourage other countries to hedge their bets, building ties with Beijing to offset the unpredictability of Washington. The likelihood of military clashes with the United States is also low. Since Trump’s foreign policy has never evinced any deep ideological commitments, it seems unlikely that the competition between the two countries will take on the more destructive dimensions of the Cold War. Trump does not want to get enmeshed in wars and would much rather focus on domestic reforms. He will soon arrive in the White House with the intention of containing China, but Chinese leaders are not dreading his return.
UNFAZED BY TRUMP
Beijing does not believe that the outcome of the 2024 presidential election in the United States has much bearing on the overall trajectory of U.S. policy toward China. No matter who entered the White House, the next president of the United States would be backed by a bipartisan consensus that perceives China as a threat to U.S. global dominance and would keep trying to contain China. Of course, not everything will remain the same from one administration to another. In his second term, Trump’s China policy will not only differ from that of U.S. President Joe Biden’s but also from that of his own first term. For instance, Trump has filled important foreign policy and national security positions with right-wing extremists, some of whom are less than 50 years old, marking a departure from the kinds of senior officials he selected after the 2016 election. Unlike those figures, many of whom were military officials steeped in the experience of the late period of the Cold War when China and the United States were strategic partners, many of his new picks came of age during China’s meteoric rise on the global stage. They see China as the primary threat to the United States, and they favor more extreme and coercive policies to suppress China’s advances.
Such a hard-line approach may not work all that well in a geopolitical context that has changed significantly since Trump’s first term. When Trump entered the White House in 2017, most countries thought he would behave in office much like a conventional leader, an ideologically neutral and economically rational decision-maker. Major U.S. allies hoped that Trump would commit to their security. Beijing invited Trump to visit China in the first year of his term. Despite U.S. opposition to Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea, the Kremlin invited Trump to Moscow in 2017 for Russia’s annual celebration of the victory in World War II.
This time, leaders are keen to protect their countries from the uncertainty of a second Trump term. French President Emmanuel Macron invited Trump to Paris in early December, hoping to underline to the president-elect that Europeans will be the main decision-makers when it comes to their security. Germany and Japan worry that Trump will demand more financial payments to guarantee the U.S. military presence in their countries. South Korea’s interim government fears that Trump will take advantage of its lack of authority to extract economic gains. Trump will have to grapple with the fact that Russia and the United States are now on opposite sides of the war in Ukraine. Washington’s unwavering political support and military aid for Israel’s brutal operation in Gaza—which many in the world consider an act of genocide—has further exposed the hypocrisy of U.S. claims to champion international law and human rights.
Since Trump took office eight years ago, Beijing has become more adept at managing its competition with Washington. This competition can be said to have begun in earnest in 2010 when U.S. President Barack Obama embarked on a “pivot to Asia.” In the succeeding years, Beijing has navigated the differing strategies of the Obama, Trump, and Biden administrations; Obama and Biden tried to contain China through multilateral approaches while Trump took a more unilateral path. With that experience, Chinese leaders are unfazed by the prospect of another Trump term, and even publicly released strategic guidelines on how to handle the president-elect’s potential policies toward China in November. Beijing, according to the document published by China’s consulate general in Los Angeles on November 17, will adhere to the “commitment to mutual respect, peaceful coexistence and win-win cooperation as principles for handling China-U.S. relations.” “Mutual respect” suggests that China will retaliate against any provocative actions taken by Trump; “peaceful coexistence” means that China will seek to engage Trump in dialogue on managing differences and conflicts to stabilize bilateral relations; and “win-win cooperation” refers to joint work on those global issues in which China and the United States have shared interests, such as ending the war in Ukraine, developing regulations and guidelines for artificial intelligence, and curbing the flow of illicit drugs.
TURBULENCE AHEAD
Trump seems intent on engaging in economic protectionism in his second term, particularly when it comes to China. He has indicated that he might levy further tariffs on Chinese goods, impose more restrictions on U.S. investment in China as well as on Chinese capital in the U.S. stock market, place more constraints on technological cooperation, and reduce the number of Chinese students studying in the United States. These decisions will invariably lead to more friction between Beijing and Washington. The Biden administration extended the tariffs that Trump placed on Chinese products during his first term, but it focused principally on excluding China from technological supply chains; it did not seek to comprehensively decouple the U.S. economy from China. During Biden’s tenure, trade in other sectors between China and the United States continued even as cooperation on cutting-edge technology came to a halt. In his second term, however, Trump is likely to push harder for wider decoupling and try to drastically reduce the market share of Chinese products in the United States, including goods assembled outside of China but heavily reliant on Chinese investments and components. Beijing will likely retaliate. The tit-for-tat dynamic may drive the simmering trade war between the two powers to a new peak, with damaging consequences for the global economy as many other countries scramble to adopt protectionist policies of their own.
As Trump courts an escalation in the trade war, his administration will likely ramp up military pressure on Beijing. When confronting adversaries, Trump has often turned to bullying and bluffing tactics, such as his threat to attack North Korea with “fire and fury” after Pyongyang tested midrange missiles in 2017. Marco Rubio, Trump’s nominee for secretary of state, and Pete Hegseth, the nominee for secretary of defense, are both considered China hawks with strong anticommunist beliefs. If the Senate approves their nominations, they may encourage Trump’s tendency to bluff when the United States seeks to address military tensions with Beijing, especially when it comes to maritime issues in the South China Sea and the conflicts about Taiwan. Through bellicose rhetoric and impulsive actions, Washington might provoke crises similar to that which followed the 2022 visit to Taiwan by Nancy Pelosi, then Speaker of the House, when China responded to U.S. provocation by stepping up its military activity in and around the Taiwan Strait. It would hardly be surprising if Trump or his officials end up sparking similar incidents and causing spikes in tensions between China and the United States.
Trump’s second term will almost certainly have a chilling effect on official dialogues between Beijing and Washington. Under the Obama administration, there were more than 90 official channels for dialogue between the two governments. By the end of Trump’s first term, there were none. Trump will likely suspend the close to 20 channels with China that the Biden administration has established, and he may replace them with new channels under his direct oversight rather than through high-ranking bureaucrats. But China will exercise extreme caution when reaching out to Trump, as leaders there still remember how Trump’s visit to Beijing in November 2017 led to a precipitous deterioration in bilateral relations in the next month when Washington denied China’s status as a developing country in the World Trade Organization.
Beyond the sparring of governments, animosity between China and the United States could grow at the societal level. Populism is gaining strength in both countries, fanning the flames of jingoism. If Trump carries through with his threat of targeting China with economic measures and engages in more saber rattling, the resulting political tension between the two states will inevitably encourage hostility between their respective peoples. Both American populists and Chinese populists (groups that mainly consist of radical netizens who follow jingoist social media influencers) attribute the cause of their domestic problems to foreign malevolence, an argument that will be encouraged by those in power as it conveniently shifts blame to an outside agent. It may become harder to improve bilateral relations as cultural and social pressure keeps the countries at loggerheads.
MIND THE GAP
Trump’s second term may create rising tensions between China and the United States as he tries to use economic and military pressure to constrain Beijing. But in practice, a Trump presidency may benefit China in several ways. For one, Trump’s relative disinterest in ideological issues may soften some of the edges of the rivalry with Beijing. With his eyes firmly fixed on the bottom line, Trump has never really cared to advocate for human rights, for instance. He has no interest in shaping China’s political system to conform to its Western counterparts, and he is therefore unlikely to be keen to intervene in China’s domestic affairs. Beijing has no plan to spread its ideology internationally, with the Chinese Communist Party focused on maintaining political stability at home. Economic and strategic conflicts may increase between Beijing and Washington during Trump’s second term, but they will not escalate into ideological conflicts that place the two states on a direct collision course.
Trump’s political isolationism—the diplomatic counterpart of his economic protectionism—may lead the United States to reduce its investments in protecting traditional allies. The president-elect has long berated U.S. allies for riding on the coattails of U.S. power and largesse. These complaints may drive U.S. allies, both European and East Asian states, to see the merits of hedging between China and the United States. Consider, for example, the case of Singapore. In 2010, with the U.S.-Chinese competition growing, Singapore adopted a strategy of hedging between the two great powers. It leaned into its economic ties with China while relying on the United States for security. Many other countries followed suit, including Japan, Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and the other ASEAN member states.
Since 2022, the war in Ukraine has shaken many Western countries and compelled them to align more closely with the United States. But if Trump reduces military aid to Ukraine, as he promised on the campaign trail, then confidence in U.S. security promises may wane. To shore up their economies so that they can better support Ukraine’s war effort, European countries may become more forthright hedgers, allowing China fresh opportunities to build economic cooperation with the United States’ traditional allies. Trump also sees himself as a peacemaker and would like to be able to say that he brought the war in Ukraine to an end. China could play a constructive role in helping Trump achieve that goal. The war has only negative consequences for the Chinese economy, and Beijing would be happy to see the back of it. China has a close relationship with Russia. It could leverage that influence in working with Trump to find an effective peace deal.
Trump will also seek to avoid overt conflict with China, no matter his strident rhetoric. The issue of Taiwan’s independence has been and will remain a source of friction between Beijing and Washington, but China and the United States are unlikely to go to war over it. In the next four years, Beijing’s attention will be significantly occupied by the task of reviving the country’s slowing economy. China is not about to draw up a timetable for reunification with Taiwan when it is concerned primarily with its own GDP growth. For his part, Trump wants to go down in history as one of the greatest U.S. presidents, on par with the likes of George Washington and Abraham Lincoln. To that end, he will focus on domestic reforms and building a strong economy at home. He will not want to get entangled in the matter of Taiwan and risk entering a war between great powers—after all, he is very proud of not having started a single war during his first term.
Those who anticipate a darkening cold war between China and Trump’s United States are misguided. The United States’ competition with China is not over ideology—as it was with the Soviet Union—but over technology. In the digital age, security and prosperity depend hugely on technological progress. China and the United States will battle over innovation in fields such as artificial intelligence and wrestle over markets and high-technology supply chains. They will not—and certainly not under Trump—seek to convert others to their preferred governing ideology. The Soviet Union and the United States used proxy wars to spread communism and capitalism, respectively. The global South, in particular, still feels the echoes of the devastation and upheaval these wars unleashed around the world. Today, however, proxy conflicts between the great powers serve little purpose. Beijing has no interest in changing another country’s ideology. Similarly, Trump has no interest in spreading American values, whatever he thinks them to be. He sees the war in Ukraine as a proxy war against Russia and finds the endeavor wholly objectionable. There is no reason for him to stoke a proxy war against China across the Taiwan Strait or in the South China Sea. After all, China has far more economic and military resources than does Russia.
In great power competition, foreign policy can often play second fiddle to domestic policy. Although Trump’s isolationism certainly creates opportunities for Beijing to improve its relations with U.S. allies, reforms at home will really determine the course of the competition between the two powers. Currently, both Chinese leaders and Trump’s team are preoccupied by domestic matters more than foreign ones. If Chinese leaders do a better job of implementing reforms than Trump does in the next four years, China will narrow the power gap with the United States. But if Trump does a better job than China in this aspect—and eschews damaging foreign conflicts and entanglements—the power gap between the two countries will get bigger.
