约瑟夫·奈：美国应该与中国打一场新冷战吗？

作者：约瑟夫·奈-文-张涓-译

2023-09-06

编辑按：美国布鲁金斯学会近日邀请了几位专家，讨论美国是否应该与中国打一场新冷战（Should the US pursue a new Cold War with China?）。其中一位邀请的专家是哈佛大学肯尼迪学院资深教授、软实力观点的提出者约瑟夫·奈 （Joseph Nye）。《美中故事会》翻译了他的开篇论点，以飨读者。

中美之间的大国竞争是21世纪上半叶的一个决定性特征，但对于如何描述这一特征，学术界和政策界尚未达成共识。如果“冷战”意味着激烈、长期的竞争，那么我们目前就身处于其中；但如果这个词被用作是对过去的历史隐喻，那么我们就不是处在一场冷战中，不仅如此，我们还应该避免打一场新冷战。

把目前的美中关系比作历史上的美苏冷战，会误导我们真正认清中国带来的挑战。美国和苏联在全球军事领域紧密依存，但在经济或社会方面几乎完全相互隔绝。不仅如此，美中在气候变化等生态领域相互依存的挑战当时还不存在。从这些角度讲，今天美国面临的中国挑战截然不同。

如果我们想在经济上与中国完全脱钩，我们、我们的盟友和第三国不可能不为此付出巨大的经济代价。美国每年与中国的贸易额超过5000亿美元，而中国已经学会了如何利用市场的创造力，以苏联从未掌握的方式来完善其国家治理。美国及其盟国并没有受到共产主义输出的威胁，而是受到美国和中国都可以操纵的经济和政治相互依存体系的威胁。在安全问题上部分脱钩或“去风险”是必要的，但全面的经济脱钩的代价将非常高昂，很少有盟友愿意这样做。值得一提的是，将中国当作主要贸易伙伴的国家多于美国。

此外，气候变化和流行病等相互依存的生态方面的挑战有着物理和生物学特有的定律，这使得脱钩根本不可能。没有一个国家能够单独解决这些跨国问题。全球相互依存要求美国一方面要与其他国一起利用好各种实力，另一方面也要求美国能够向其他国家施加这些实力。无论好坏，我们都陷入了与中国的“合作竞争”之中，我们需要一种能够同时完成两个目标的战略。这不像冷战时期的遏制。应对中国挑战将需要一个更复杂的战略，必须利用我们的盟友体系和基于规则的国际秩序。印度等盟友和伙伴是我们拥有但中国所缺乏的资源。尽管过去一个世纪经济重心已从欧洲转移到亚洲，但亚洲包括印度，它是中国的竞争对手，并不是盟友。此外，西方民主盟友的财富总和远远超过中国（加上俄罗斯）。

如果我们将战略成功定义为像冷战结束时苏联崩溃的方式来寻求改变中国，那么我们很可能会失败。尽管CCP害怕西方的自由化，但中国太大了，我们无法入侵或强迫中国进行国内变革，而反过来也是如此。从这个意义上说，除非我们陷入一场重大战争，否则中国和美国都不会对彼此构成生存威胁。最贴切的历史比喻不是1945年的欧洲，而是1914年的欧洲。我们预期两国会有低强度的经济冲突，但我们的战略目标应该是避免升级，维护盟友并确保我们在未来继续发挥主导地位（但不是霸权）的国际机制。在这一点上，正如美国国务卿安东尼·布林肯曾提到的“和平共处”的口号所阐述的那样。

鉴于中国实力的增长，这些战略目标是否可行？答案是肯定的，如果我们出一手好牌的话，我们就会处于更强势的位置。美国拥有重大的地缘政治优势，中国不太可能取代我们的主导地位。从地理上看，我们濒临两大洋，有友好邻邦，而中国与印度、印度尼西亚、日本、马来西亚、菲律宾、越南等国都存在领土争端。我们的第二个优势是能源：页岩油气革命使美国从能源进口国一跃成为出口国。另一方面，中国高度依赖通过波斯湾和印度洋的能源进口，而美国在这些地区拥有海军优势。美国还拥有人口优势，未来十年劳动力可能会继续增长，而中国的劳动力则将萎缩。中国的劳动适龄人口在2015年达到顶峰，而印度也超过中国成为世界上人口最多的国家。尽管中国在某些领域表现出色，但美国在生物技术、纳米技术和信息技术等关键技术方面仍处于领先地位。美国研究型大学在高等教育领域占据主导地位，而中国还没有一所大学能进入世界前二十名。总之，虽然中国拥有令人印象深刻的优势，但也存在严重的弱点和问题。解决人口下降的办法是提高生产率，但其生产率一直在下降，因为政府对私营企业人才的严格控制可能会削弱母鸡下蛋的能力。

尽管美国握有一副好牌，但错误的战略可能会导致我们抛弃盟友，摒弃国际机制，并严格限制移民。新加坡前总理李光耀表示，他不认为中国会超越美国，因为美国有能力吸引全世界的人才，并将他们的多样性和创造力重新组合起来。鉴于其民族主义和政治体制，我们的开放程度是中国望尘莫及的。

我们对中国的战略应该是利用威慑避免热战或冷战，在可能的领域进行合作，并整合我们的资源以更有力地与之竞争。我们的战略目标应该是通过加强我们的盟友和国际机构来塑造中国的对外行为。中国沿海第一岛链的关键是日本。日本是美国的亲密盟友，我们需要在那里继续驻军。同时，我们要增强美国国内经济和技术优势。采取更积极的亚洲贸易政策是明智的，我们应该向转向中国的贫穷国家提供更多的援助。我们必须保持美国国内开放和民主价值观。民意调查显示，这些价值观赋予我们比中国更大的软实力。美国加强对中国的军事威慑受到许多希望与中国保持友好关系但又不想被中国主导的国家的欢迎。如果我们避免妖魔化和误导性的历史类比，我们就能制定出比新冷战更有希望的战略。

以下是英文原文：

Should the US pursue a new Cold War with China?

The great power competition between the United States and China is a defining feature of the first half of the 21st century, but there is little agreement on how it should be characterized. If “Cold War” means intense prolonged competition, then we are in one, but if the term is used as a historical metaphor for the past, then we are not (yet), and should avoid it.

Analogies to the historical Cold War can mislead us about the real challenges we face from China. The United States and the Soviet Union had a high level of global military interdependence, but virtually no economic or social interdependence. Moreover, ecological interdependence such as climate change was not yet an issue. The China challenge today is quite different.

We cannot decouple our economy completely from China without enormous economic costs to us, our allies, and third countries. The United States does over half a trillion dollars in trade annually with China, and China has learned to harness the creativity of markets to authoritarian Communist Party control in ways the Soviets never mastered. The United States and its allies aren’t threatened by the export of communism, but by a system of economic and political interdependence that both the United States and China can manipulate. Partial decoupling or “de-risking” on security issues is necessary, but total economic decoupling would be very costly, and few allies would follow suit. More countries count China than the United States as their leading trade partner.

Moreover, the ecological aspects of interdependence such as climate change and pandemics obey the laws of physics and biology which make decoupling impossible. No country can solve these transnational problems alone. Global interdependence requires using power with others as well as over others. For better and worse, we are locked in a “cooperative rivalry” with China in which we need a strategy that can accomplish two contradictory things at the same time. This is not like Cold War containment. Meeting the China challenge will require a more complex strategy that leverages the alliances and rules-based system we created. Our allies and partners like India are assets that China lacks. While the center of economic gravity has shifted from Europe to Asia over the past century, Asia includes India, which is a Chinese rival, not an ally. Moreover, the combined wealth of the Western democratic allies will far exceed that of China (plus Russia) well into this century.

If we define strategic success as transforming China in a way similar to the collapse of the Soviet regime at the end of the Cold War, we are likely to fail. Although the Communist Party fears Western liberalization, China is too big for us to invade or coerce domestic change, and the reciprocal is true. In that sense, neither China nor the United States poses an existential threat to each other unless we blunder into a major war. The most apt historical metaphor is not Europe in 1945 but Europe in 1914. We should expect low intensity and economic conflict, but our strategic objectives should be to avoid escalation — U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken has used the slogan of “peaceful coexistence” — and to preserve the alliances and institutions that will continue our role as the leading (though not hegemonic) country in the future.

Are these strategic objectives feasible given the growth of Chinese power? Yes, because we have been dealt a strong hand if we play it well. The United States has major geopolitical advantages, and China is unlikely to displace us as a leading power. Geographically, we are bordered by two oceans and friendly neighbors, while China has territorial disputes with India, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam. A second advantage is energy: the shale oil and gas revolution has transformed the United States from an importer to an exporter. China, on the other hand, is highly dependent on energy imports passing through the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean, where the United States has naval supremacy. The United States also has a demographic advantage with a workforce that is likely to grow over the next decade, while China’s will shrink. China’s working-age population peaked in 2015, and India has passed China as the world’s most populous nation. And while China excels in some subfields, America remains at the forefront in the key technologies of biotechnology, nanotechnology, and information technology. American research universities dominate higher education while no Chinese universities rank in the top twenty. China has impressive strengths, but also serious weaknesses and problems. The answer to its demographic decline is to increase productivity but total factor productivity has been dropping, and tight party control of private entrepreneurial talent may weaken the geese that lay golden eggs.

While the United States holds high cards, a misguided strategy could lead us to discard our aces of alliances and international institutions or severely restrict immigration. Former Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew said he did not think China would surpass the United States because of America’s ability to draw on the talents of the entire world and to recombine them in diversity and creativity. Given its ethnic nationalism and party state, this kind of openness is not possible for China.

Our strategy toward China should use deterrence to avoid either a hot or cold war, cooperate when possible, and marshal our assets to compete successfully. Our strategic objective should be to shape China’s external behavior by strengthening our alliances and international institutions. The key to the first island chain off China’s shore is Japan, a close American ally where we station troops. At the same time, we should bolster our economy and technological advantages at home. A more active Asian trade policy would be wise, and we should offer assistance to poor countries being wooed by China. We must maintain our domestic openness and democratic values that polls show have given us much greater soft power than China. Strengthening our military power of deterrence is welcomed by the many countries that want to maintain friendly relations with China but do not want to be dominated by it. If we avoid demonization and misleading historical analogies, we can manage a strategy that holds more promise for us than a new cold war.