专访：埃默里大学博尔顿教授谈美国国会政治现状
1月7日凌晨，代表加利福尼亚州第20国会选区的众议员凯文·麦卡锡（Kevin McCarthy）终于获得50%加1的选票，成为美国众议院第55任议长。这次选举共经过15轮投票，是美国国会众议院164年以来耗时最长的选举。为了获得足够的选票，麦卡锡与共和党内部极端保守的一翼反复谈判，并作出巨大让步。为了更好地了解美国国会的政治生态及其对美中关系的影响，我采访了埃默里大学政治学教授亚历山大·博尔顿 （Dr. Alexander Bolton）。
博尔顿是埃默里大学政治学教授，在普林斯顿大学获得政治学博士学位，主要研究领域为总统、国会议员和其他政治代理人如何维持官僚控制和影响政策制定，著有Checks in the Balance: Legislative Capacity and the Dynamics of Executive Power (Princeton University Press, 2021)、“Gridlock, Bureaucratic Control, and Non-Statutory Policymaking in Congress” (American Journal of Political Science, 2022)、“Legislative Constraints, Ideological Conflict, and the Timing of Executive Unilateralism” (Legislative Studies Quarterly, 2022) 等英文专著。
以下是英文采访的中文翻译：
2022年美国中期选举后，共和党在众议院拥有222个席位，而民主党拥有213个。共和党在众议院的多数优势有多大？这将如何影响民主党在未来两年的立法目标？
博尔顿：共和党在众议院的多数优势很小，但在过去几十年中，微弱多数在众议院已经变得越来越普遍。作为比较，在2020年的大选中，民主党在众议院也同样获取了222个席位。
这些微弱的多数优势对政党领导人构成了挑战，如果他们想要通过任何立法，就必须在议会中赢得多数席位。这也使少数党在立法方面的合作动力减弱，因为如果他们认为自己有可能在下一次选举中夺回多数席位，他们就会避免让多数党在立法上“获胜”。
共和党对众议院的控制将严重阻碍民主党和拜登政府的立法雄心。任何立法都需要得到参众两院共和党的批准才能通过。在上一届国会，民主党可以利用协调（reconciliation）等程序绕过参议院的共和党，《2022年降低通胀法》就是这样获得通过的。由于共和党目前控制着众议院的议事日程，民主党在未来通过有争议的立法方面不能做同样的事情。
共和党众议员凯文·麦卡锡在经过15轮投票和对极右翼保守派议员做出一系列关键让步后，终于当选众议院议长。您能否谈谈你对麦卡锡当选议长的见解？
博尔顿：已经有一个多世纪没有议长候选人在第一轮投票中无法当选的事情，因此这是一个不同寻常的事件。这次议长竞选反映了共和党核心的内部分歧。一部分议员似乎对麦卡锡个人不信任，可能永远不会投他的票。然而，另一部分议员则利用共和党的微弱多数优势，迫使麦卡锡做出让步，以换取他们的选票，从而推进他们自己的政治和政策。
我们目前还不知道所有的幕后“交易”，但一些谈判已经被媒体上公开报道。例如，由共和党一些最保守的成员组成的“自由党团”，现在将在众议院规则委员会中拥有更多的代表权，在那里他们可以影响在众议院审议的法案和修正案的议程。麦卡锡的另一个关键让步是，允许任何共和党成员提出“罢黜议长的动议”，如果众议院大多数成员同意该动议（这只需要少数共和党人倒戈），就可以有效地罢免麦卡锡。这些让步会在政策进程中增强保守议员的影响，并削弱麦卡锡议长对立法程序的控制。
众议院共和党未能团结一致支持麦卡锡竞选议长，这是否预示着共和党将在执政过程中面临困难? 在您看来，美国民主何去何从? 这是“后特朗普时代”的现象吗?
博尔顿：此次议长选举凸显了新共和党多数派的一些重要特征。首先，党团在某种程度上存在意识形态分歧，在众议院应该如何运作的问题上也存在分歧。麦卡锡议长不得不做出重大让步，以获得反对者的选票，但这样做，他把大部分权力从领导层下放给了个别议员。
其次，有一小部分坚定的党团成员已经表明，他们会刻意阻挠立法议程，直到他们的要求得到满足。而领导层已经表现出最终满足这些要求的意愿。我不禁认为，议长的选举向领导层展示了一个小团体在一个拥有微弱多数的共和党内可以拥有的权力，并使政策向他们的方向倾斜。他们很可能在各种大大小小的立法上使用这一权力，这可能会对政府拨款和债务上限等问题产生深远影响。此外，随着麦卡锡议长为赢得这个职位而做出的一系列程序性上的让步，他们的筹码也增加了。
当然，共和党的右翼并不是唯一拥有这种筹码的群体。共和党中较温和的派系是否会利用他们的选票来制定政策，这将是一件有趣的现象。例如，他们可以威胁与民主党合作，提交立法请愿书 (如果有大多数众议员签名，就可以绕过共和党控制的规则委员会，将法案提交给国会全体成员辩论)，或者如果他们认为立法将使政策向过于极端的方向转变，他们可以投票否决审议立法的程序。
综上所述，为了让他的党团以团结一致的方式推进立法，麦卡锡议长将需要管控分歧，以实现平衡。除此之外，他还需要与参议院的民主党和拜登总统进行谈判，以通过他们也能同意的立法，这对任何立法领袖来说都是一项艰巨的任务。
在治理方面，这些因素将导致在任何没有得到两党广泛支持的问题上出现僵局。不幸的是，在新一届国会将面临的一些重大问题上(例如，提高债务上限和为政府筹集资金)，共和党和民主党的不同派系(至少到目前为止)已经表明了大相径庭的立场。这些问题需要加以管控，以避免重大的政策和经济灾难的发生。麦卡锡的议长职位能否经受住这种谈判的考验，还有待观察。
我不认为这纯粹是“后特朗普时代”的现象。类似的情况在奥巴马执政期间也曾出现过，当时共和党中的“茶党”在类似问题上(如：支出和债务上限)一直让众议院共和党议长约翰·博纳(John Boehner)感到不安。纵观历史，国会多数党经常存在深刻的意识形态和治理分歧，必须克服这些分歧才能治理国家。我们在当代所拥有的多数优势较小的政党和意识形态两极化的结合，加剧了这些问题。
在当选议长之后，麦卡锡表达了他适当的制衡才能使政府负责的信念:“我们的系统建立在制衡的基础上，是时候让[众议院]成为一种制衡，为总统的政策提供一些平衡”。与绍斯·特劳尔（Sharece Thrower）合作的《制衡: 立法能力和行政权力的动态》（Checks in the Balance: Legislative Capacity and the Dynamics of Executive Power）一书中，您探讨了“制衡是否足以约束雄心勃勃的行政人员”。一个分裂的国会——共和党控制的众议院和民主党控制的参议院——对拜登总统的行政议程意味着什么?
博尔顿：可能面临的立法僵局肯定会使拜登总统把注意力转移到利用行政部门打造政策上的胜利，这样他在竞选连任时就可以以此为基础进行竞选。行政命令或新的监管政策可以顶替依法治国的路径吗？我的研究表明，这种方法所能达到的政策效果是有限的。
一般来说，当总统和行政机构在国会面临反对时，他们不愿拓展其权力范围。尽管众议院的共和党不能单方面通过立法推翻他们所反对的行政行动，但新的行政措施往往需要资金来实施，在这种情况下，众议院的共和党将拥有重要的影响力。此外，如果拜登总统或其他行政人员在与共和党相反的方向上走得太远，他们手中有大量的工具可以迫使拜登政府付出政治代价。例如，即将上任的共和党在国会各个委员会的主席可以进行激进的监督，从而降低总统在公众心目中的形象，并将行政机构和官员束缚在传票、书面证词和公开作证之中。他们也可以拒绝对拜登总统的政治议程至关重要的政策的立法。在极端情况下，他们甚至可以弹劾行政部门的官员。很多共和党议员已经要求弹劾国土安全部部长亚历杭德罗·马约尔卡斯（Alejandro Mayorkas）。出于这些原因，即使总统和行政机构有很多办法去“绕过”国会，在国会多数人反对的情况下推行单边政策制定，但他们在实践中往往谨小慎微，因为这样的作法和可能“阻挠”他们未来与国会必须的合作。
除了国会阻挠之外，拜登总统和行政机构还需要考虑他们的行动是否会在联邦法院站得住脚，毕竟在特朗普政府之后，联邦法院有明显的保守主义倾向。来自最高法院的大法官们一直在宣布拜登政府的行动非法，并对当代政治中行政权力的宪法范围提出质疑。因此，法院对单边政策的司法限制也是可能的。
目前，两极分化的国会似乎可以在一个问题上达成一致：中国。自2021年初以来，美国政策制定者已提出约400项涉及中国的法案或决议。在您看来，目前两党在中国问题上的共识有多深？我们应该对新一届国会的中国政策有何预期？
博尔顿：我认为你引用的数据表明，两党的国会议员都对中国以及美国的对华政策感到担忧。这表现在众多的政策领域，包括贸易政策、情报、国防、经济安全、人权、技术政策等等。从本届国会的言论和行动可以清楚地看出，两党议员都将与中国的竞争视为美国未来面临的关键战略挑战。
上届国会多项涉华法案均以较大优势获得通过。例如，The Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act（P.L. 117-78）在众议院和参议院没有反对意见的情况下获得通过。此外，《2022年SBIR和STTR延长法案》（P.L. 117-183）有与中国有关的重要条款，它以415票通过了众议院，并获得参议院的一致通过。这清楚地表明，在国会中至少有一些领域存在两党对中国的共识。
在当选众议院议长后的首次演讲中，麦卡锡将“中国共产党的崛起”列为美国面临的两大关键挑战之一（另一个是债务问题）。鉴于此，可以肯定地说，美中关系将是第118届国会关注的一个重要的话题。国会的议员担忧将如何转化为立法和官方政策仍有待观察。
可能出现的具体问题包括：在供应链的关键环节减少对中国生产的依赖；在美国运营有中国母公司的应用程序，如抖音；human rights，特别是在 Xinjiang 和 Tibet；美国公司为了在中国经营而愿意遵守中国的要求；COVID-19大流行病的起源和出现；贸易惯例；台湾政策；中国在南中国海的影响；等等。
1月10日，美国众议院以365票赞成、65票反对组建了“美中战略竞争特别委员会”（ The Select Committee on the Strategic Competition Between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party ），这是共和党控制众议院以来首次表决。关于这个委员会有哪些重要的信息需要了解？此外，麦卡锡议长在支持该决议时强调，“我向诸位保证和承诺，这不是一个具有党派性质的委员会。这将是一个具有两党性质的委员会”。情况真的会是这样吗？
博尔顿：这次投票显示出两党对中国政策的深切关注和担忧。该委员会将由众议员迈克·加拉格尔（Mike Gallagher）担任主席。尽管他非常保守，在中国问题上被称为“鹰派”，但他没有表现出计划将该委员会引向特别偏向党派的方向。该委员会没有“立法权”（ legislative jurisdiction ）；相反，其作用是调查问题并向众议院提供立法建议。这些建议的可信度，以及它们最终能否转化为民主党控制的参议院和拜登总统能够签署的法律，在一定程度上取决于该委员会是否会以一种能让共和党和民主党达成某种共识的方式进行调查和审议。
值得注意的是，一些投票支持该委员会的民主党众议员对其发展方向持保留态度。在关于设立该委员会的决议的辩论中，众议员乔治·麦戈文（George McGovern）说，“我们很多人担心这个委员会会变成一个宣扬共和党阴谋论和党派谈话要点的委员会。我们不希望它成为一个长期仇视亚裔的地方。我们不能也不会容忍这种情况”。
我认为所有这些都表明，这个委员会在一些问题问题上有机会实现两党合作，但不能保证这种情况肯定发生。该委员会能否利用这一机会创造有意义的政策变化，将在很大程度上取决于众议员加拉格尔的领导能力，以及他决定如何为该委员会制定议程。
美中关系的一个核心问题是国会对台湾的立场。麦卡锡曾支持佩洛西访问台湾，并说他希望作为众议院议长也这么做。您认为麦卡锡访问台湾的可能性有多大?
博尔顿：此时此刻，麦卡锡议长访问台湾几乎已成定局。他去年支持佩洛西议长的访问，更何况所有报道都表明，他打算在不久的将来亲自前往。
Emory University’s Dr. Alex Bolton on the Current State of American Congressional Politics
On January 7th, Congressman Kevin McCarthy (R-Calif.) was elected as the nation’s 55th House speaker in a historic post-midnight vote. McCarthy ascended to victory after a 5-day revolt from ultraconservative legislators and a bitter 15-ballot floor fight, which resulted in McCarthy making concessions. To make sense of the current state of the U.S. congressional politics and their implications for U.S.-China relations, I spoke with Dr. Alexander D. Bolton, an Associate Professor of Political Science at Emory University.
Dr. Bolton studies American political institutions with interests in how presidents, congresspeople, and other political agents maintain bureaucratic control and influence policymaking. His recent works include Checks in the Balance: Legislative Capacity and the Dynamics of Executive Power (Princeton University Press, 2021), “Gridlock, Bureaucratic Control, and Non-Statutory Policymaking in Congress” (American Journal of Political Science, 2022), and “Legislative Constraints, Ideological Conflict, and the Timing of Executive Unilateralism” (Legislative Studies Quarterly, 2022). He received his PhD in political science from Princeton University.
After the 2022 U.S. midterm elections, the Republicans have 222 seats in the House while the Democrats have 213. How narrow is the Republican House majority? How will this impact the Democratic Party’s legislative goals over the next two years?
Dr. Bolton: The Republican House majority is narrow, but narrow majorities in the House have become increasingly common over the last several decades. By way of comparison, in the 2020 elections, Democrats also won 222 seats.
These slim majorities pose challenges for party leaders, who must rely on commanding the floor with a majority if they want to pass their agendas. It also gives minority parties less incentives to cooperate on legislation, because if they believe they might be able to reclaim the majority in the next elections, they want to avoid giving legislative “wins” to the majority party.
This change in partisan control of the House will seriously stymie the legislative ambitions of the Democratic Party and the Biden administration. Any legislation will now need approval from Republicans in the House and the Senate to pass. In the last Congress, Democrats could use procedures like reconciliation to bypass Republicans in the Senate in order to enact bills like the Inflation Reduction Act. This option is off the table for passing party-line legislation now that Republicans control the agenda in the House of Representatives.
Republican Senator Kevin McCarthy secured his House speakership after 15 rounds of voting and a string of key concessions to far-right conservative lawmakers. Could you provide some insights into what went on behind the scenes in McCarthy’s speaker election?
Dr. Bolton: It has been a century since a candidate for Speaker has been unable to command a majority on the first ballot, so this was quite a remarkable event. The dynamics of this Speaker race reflected several fractures in the Republican caucus. Some members appeared to personally distrust Speaker McCarthy and were likely never to vote for him. Others, however, took advantage of the narrow Republican majority to extract concessions—that would advance their own political and policy causes—in exchange for their votes.
We don’t have a full public accounting yet of all the “deals” that were made behind closed doors for votes, but some have been publicly reported. The House Freedom Caucus, which is comprised of some of the most conservative members of the caucus, will now have greater representation on the House Rules Committee, where they can impact what bills and amendments are considered on the floor. Another key concession to the holdouts was to allow any Republican member to introduce a “motion to vacate the chair,” which could effectively depose Speaker McCarthy if a majority of the House agrees to the motion (which could occur with just a handful of Republican defections). Together, these types of concessions have the effect of empowering the holdout votes in the policy process moving forward and weakening Speaker McCarthy’s procedural control over the chamber.
Does the failure of House Republicans to unite around Kevin McCarthy for House Speaker foreshadow any specific difficulties Republicans will face in governing? What does this portend, in your view, about American democracy? Is this a post-Trump phenomenon?
Dr. Bolton: The election for Speaker highlighted some important features of the new Republican majority. First, the caucus is fractured, to some degree on ideological lines but also on how the House should be run. Speaker McCarthy had to made significant concessions to secure the holdouts’ votes, but in doing so he devolved a significant degree of power from the leadership to individual members.
Second, there is a small, but resolved, portion of the caucus that has demonstrated their willingness to obstruct until their demands are met. And the leadership has demonstrated the willingness to eventually meet those demands. I cannot help but think the speakership election demonstrated to those members the real power that a small group in a very narrow majority can have to bend policy in their direction. They will be tempted to use this power on all sorts of legislation, small and large, with potentially profound effects on issues like government funding and the debt ceiling. Moreover, their leverage has only increased with the set of procedural concessions made by Speaker McCarthy to win the position.
Of course, the right wing of the caucus is not the only set of members with this leverage. It will be interesting to see whether more moderate factions of the Republican caucus will use their votes to shape policies. They, for instance, can credibly threaten to team up with Democrats to use discharge petitions (which can bypass the Republican-run Rules Committee and bring bills to the floor if a majority of House members sign them) or vote down procedures for considering legislation if they feel it will shift policy in too extreme a direction.
Together this suggests that Speaker McCarthy will face a precarious balancing act in getting his caucus to advance legislation in a united way. On top of this, do not forget that he also needs to negotiate with Democrats in the Senate and President Biden to pass legislation that they can also agree to. This is a tall order for any legislative leader.
In terms of governance, all of this adds up to a recipe for gridlock on any issue that does not command wide bipartisan support. Unfortunately, on some of the major issues that the new Congress will confront (most notably, raising the debt ceiling and funding the government), the different factions of the Republican caucus and Democrats have staked out (at least as of now) wildly divergent positions. These will need to be reconciled to avert major policy and economic catastrophes. Whether McCarthy’s speakership can survive that negotiation remains to be seen.
I do not think this is a purely post-Trump phenomenon. Very recently, similar dynamics existed during the Obama administration when the Tea Party Republicans were a constant source of agita for Speaker John Boehner on similar issues (most notably spending and the debt ceiling). Throughout history, congressional majorities have often had deep ideological and governing divisions that had to be overcome to govern. However, adding on top of this, the combination of marginal majorities and cross-party ideological polarization that we have in the contemporary moment exacerbates these issues.
After securing his speakership, McCarthy conveyed his belief in proper checks and balances to hold the government accountable: “it’s time for [the House] to be a check and provide some balance to the president’s policies.” In your book Checks in the Balance: Legislative Capacity and the Dynamics of Executive Power with Sharece Thrower, you explored whether “checks and balances [are] enough to constrain ambitious executives.” What does a divided Congress—with a Republican House and a Democratic Senate—mean for President Biden’s executive agenda?
Dr. Bolton: The legislative gridlock he is likely to face will certainly make it tempting for President Biden to shift his focus toward using the executive branch to create policy wins that he can campaign on if he runs for reelection. This might take the form of executive orders or new regulatory policies. However, my research and others suggest that there are limits to how much can be achieved with such an approach.
In general, presidents and agencies are reluctant to push the bounds of their authority when they face opposition in Congress. Even though Republicans in the House cannot unilaterally pass legislation to overturn executive actions they oppose, new executive actions often require funding to implement, and in that context House Republicans will have significant leverage. Moreover, if President Biden or other executive actors go too far in the view of the new Republican majority, they possess a wide arsenal of tools to impose political costs on the administration. For instance, incoming Republican committee chairs can pursue aggressive and contentious oversight that can diminish the president’s standing in the eyes of the public and tie up agencies and officials in subpoenas, depositions, and public testimony. They can refuse to take up legislation that is important to President Biden’s agenda. In the extreme, they can impeach officials in the executive branch. Substantial numbers of Republicans have already called for the impeachment of Department of Homeland Security Secretary Mayorkas. For these reasons, even though presidents and agencies have a lot of incentives to “go around” Congress and pursue unilateral policymaking when congressional majorities oppose them, they often in practice exercise considerable caution to avoid these types of sanctions and the possibility of “poisoning the well” for future cooperation with Congress they will need.
On top of congressional sanctions, President Biden and executive agencies will also need to consider whether their actions will stand up in the federal courts, which—after the Trump administration—have a distinctly conservative bent. Federal judges from the Supreme Court have not been reticent to nullify actions by the Biden administration and question the constitutional scope of administrative authority in contemporary politics. Thus, judicially-imposed limits on an aggressive unilateral policy also cannot be discounted.
At the moment, it appears that the polarized Congress can coalesce on one matter: China. Since early 2021, around 400 bills or resolutions concerning China have been put forward by American policymakers. In your view, how deep is the current bipartisan consensus on China? What should we expect from the new Congress on China policy?
Dr. Bolton: I think the statistics you cite suggest that members of Congress in both parties have concerns about China and US policy toward China. That manifests in a multitude of policy domains, including trade policy, intelligence, defense, economic security, human rights, technology policy, and more. It is clear from both the rhetoric and actions of the current Congress that members in both parties see competition with China as a key strategic challenge for the United States moving forward.
In the last Congress, several bills related to China passed by large margins. For example, the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (P.L. 117-78) passed without opposition in the House or the Senate. The Small Business Innovation Research and Small Business Technology Transfer Act of 2022 (P.L. 117-183), which has important provisions related to China, passed the House with 415 votes and unanimously in the Senate. This makes it clear that there are at least some areas of bipartisan consensus on China in the Congress.
In his first speech after being elected Speaker, Kevin McCarthy identified “the rise of the Chinese Communist party” as one of the two critical challenges facing the United States (along with the debt). Given this, it is safe to say that US-China relations will be a frequent topic of deliberation in the 118th Congress. How these concerns will translate into legislation and official policy changes remains to be seen.
Specific issues that are likely to emerge include: lessening the reliance on Chinese production for vital aspects of the supply chain; the operation of apps with Chinese parent companies, such as TikTok, in the United States; human rights, particularly in the Xinjiang province and Tibet; US corporations’ willingness to comply with Chinese demands in order to operate in China; the origins and emergence of the COVID-19 pandemic; trade practices; Taiwan policy; Chinese influence in the South China Sea; and more.
On January 10th, the U.S. House of Representatives voted 365 to 65 in favor of creating the Select Committee on the Strategic Competition Between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party, marking one of the first votes since the Republicans took control of the House. What is important to know about this committee on U.S.-China competition? Furthermore, Speaker McCarthy said in support of the resolution: “You have my word and my commitment. This is not a partisan committee. This will be a bipartisan committee.” Will this be the case?
Dr. Bolton: This vote is suggestive of the deep concerns across party lines about China policy. The committee will be chaired by Representative Mike Gallagher who, while very conservative and known for being a “hawk” on China issues, has not indicated that he intends to lead the panel in a particularly partisan direction. The committee does not have “legislative jurisdiction”; instead, its role is to investigate issues and report recommendations to the House of Representatives. The credibility of those recommendations and whether they are ultimately translated into policy changes that the Democratic-controlled Senate and President Biden can sign onto will depend in part on whether the committee does investigate and deliberate in a manner that brings Republicans and Democrats to some consensus.
Notably, some Democrats voting in favor of the committee did so with some reservations about the direction it will go. During the debate on the resolution to create it, Rep. McGovern said, “many of us have concerns about this turning into a committee that focuses on pushing Republican conspiracy theories and partisan talking points. We certainly don’t want it to turn into a place that perpetuates anti-Asian hate. We cannot and will not tolerate that.”
To me, all this indicates that there is an opportunity for bipartisanship on issues within the jurisdiction of the committee but there’s no guarantee that it will emerge. Whether the committee can leverage these opportunities to create meaningful policy changes will depend in no small part on the leadership of Rep. Gallagher and how he decides to set the agenda for the panel.
One central issue in U.S.-China relations is the congressional position on Taiwan. McCarthy supported Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan and voiced his desire to do the same as Speaker of the House. In your estimation, what is the likelihood of McCarthy paying a visit to Taiwan?
Dr. Bolton: At this point, it is almost certain that Speaker McCarthy will visit Taiwan. He supported Speaker Pelosi’s trip last year, and all reporting suggests he intends to go himself in the relatively near future.
