乔桥:美国2022年《国家安全战略报告》毫无新意

作者:乔桥

2022-10-13

特朗普总统在2017年12月18日签发了《国家安全战略报告》。该战略全文共68页,重点阐述了美国国家安全战略的四大支柱,即“保卫美国本土、促进美国繁荣、以实力维护和平、提升美国影响力”,强调将应对影响美国全球地位的主要挑战,包括“像中国、俄罗斯这样的修正主义国家”、地区独裁者、暴力恐怖分子及跨国恐怖组织。

2021年3月3日,拜登总统签署了《临时国家安全战略指南》(点击这里查看《指南》英文全文),全文24页,要求美国各“部委”在制定国内国外政策时以此作为指导方针。《指南》看门见山地说,“我们面临一个民族主义高涨、民主退潮、与中国、俄罗斯和其它威权国家的角逐不断加深,而技术革命影响着我们生活的方方面面。我们的时代面临前所未有的挑战,然而也有着无与伦比的机会。”《指南》的结论说,“眼下世界走到了一个拐点,人们在就我们世界未来的发展方向展开基本模式的辩论。我们要在这场辩论中获胜就必须证明民主还能为我们的人民谋幸福。胜利不会水到渠成。我们必须捍卫我们的民主、巩固它,更新它。这意味着我们必须完善我们的经济基础,恢复我们在国际机构的地位,在国内和海外弘扬和宣讲我们的价值观,在推进外交的同时实现军事能力的现代化,重振让世界和让我们的人民更安全的盟国和友邦网络。没有哪个国家处在比美国更为优越的地位保证我们朝着这个方向迈进。要做到这一点,我们必须拥抱和守住我们经久不衰的优势,以信心和实力管理世界。如果我们这样做,并与我们的民主盟国齐心协力,我们就能从容应对任何一个挑战国家,并超越它。人心齐,我们就能再度辉煌。”

白宫新闻发言人在《指南》发布后回答记者问题时说,正式报告将在今年晚些时候发布。然而,拜登总统直到2022年10月12日才签署了自己的《国家安全战略报告》。美国国家安全顾问沙利文(Jake Sullivan)说,俄乌战争导致了报告的延迟发布。这份报告48页。用路透社的话说,它“不包含思维的重大转变,也没有为拜登的外交政策引入任何重大的新准则。”

这个报告明确了美国捍卫国家安全的三件大事:首先是胜过(outcompete)中国、遏制俄罗斯;其次,建立强大的盟国体系,与盟国和其他有意愿的国家在气候和能源安全、疫情、粮食、武器控制与非核扩散,以及恐怖主义等方面共同合作;第三,在科技、网络及经贸领域成为规则的制定国。

按理说,俄罗斯对乌克兰的入侵和对欧洲和世界局势的打击应该令其理所当然地成为美国的头号敌人,但这个报告把中国当作对美国国家安全威胁最大的国家。即使在俄罗斯入侵乌克兰之后,对全球秩序而言,中国仍是后果最为重大的挑战。报告还说,为了实现这一目标,美国必须同时走好三步棋:一、做好“家庭作业“,投资和完善美国自身的创新、制造、供应链和基础设施;二、建立志同道合的联盟;三、从优势地位展开与中国竞争。如果美国希望保持其在全世界的影响力,它必须赢得与中国这个超级大国的经济和军备竞赛。

沙利文在报告发布后举行的记者招待会上说,“中华人民共和国持有这样的意图,而且其能力越来越大,要重塑国际秩序,使国际竞争环境对向对其有利的方向倾斜,即使美国仍在致力于负责任地管控我们两国之间的竞争。他还说,美国必须处理好与中国的关系,美国不寻求将竞争转变成对抗或新冷战,与每一个国家往来会以追求双方共同利益和繁荣为先,而非沦为美中竞争的代理人战场。

沙利文还说,这份报告提出了国家安全的双轨制(dual track),即美国一边要与中国激烈竞争,一边还要跟中国及其他并不一定跟美国志同道合的国家合作应对一系列影响世界各地人民的跨国挑战,包括气候变化、粮食安全、传染病、恐怖主义、能源转型和通货膨胀。

报告还提到关于中国对台湾采取越来越强硬的行动。报告指出,台海和平稳定对区域和全球安全与繁荣至关重要,也是国际关注的焦点。美国反对任何一方当方面改变现状,美国不支持台湾独立,美国依然恪守基于台湾关系法,并会持续支持台湾自我防卫。

首先,《报告》了无新意,它不过是重复了拜登总统2021年3月和国务卿布林肯2022年5月对中国政策的阐述,主题是不但要与中国竞争,还要把中国击败。问题是,击败中国的目的是什么?中国败北的指标又是什么?

其次,《报告》有点不合时宜。在俄罗斯在乌克兰大打出手、兼并领土并威胁要在战场使用战术核武器的时候,依然把中国当作自己最危险的敌人,不是对现实视而不见,就是对中国的崛起有一种本能的、失去理性的、甚至可能是由种族主义优越感导致的恐惧。

第三,虽然报告本身和它的主要起草人都提出与中国竞争不是搞新冷战,也不要求其他国家选边站队,但美国政府的言行似乎都是要把北京逼入死胡同,让北京做出过激的反应。把美中之争的性质归纳为民主与专制之争不过是借口,华盛顿真正要做到的是在科技、经贸和军事上让北京“人仰马翻”。

最后,一个国家的安全和人民的幸福重要支柱之一是这个国家的经济发展,而这份报告居然对给美中两国经济造成巨大创伤的关税问题闭口不谈。是白宫国安官员无知还是美国贸易代表有偏见?沙利文在被问到这一问题是轻描淡写地说,贸易代表办公室刚刚启动了对301关税效果的评估。

《报告》对这个世界面临的问题和挑战看得很准,对这些问题和挑战可能对美国构成的威胁也说得很透,但把解决这些问题和消除这些挑战的前提建立在战胜中国的基础上不仅不合逻辑,而且偏离现实。电子期刊《看中国》(Sinocism)的创始编辑利明璋(Bill Bishop)说,《报告》与美国国务卿布林肯的讲话大同小异,但没有对“击败中国”做出任何定义。换句话说,2022年美国国家安全战略不过是对付中国的工具箱,它只能让两国在脱钩的道路上越走越远。

下附2022年「美国国家安全报告简要」英文原文(点击此处可下载报告全文):

President Biden’s National Security Strategy outlines how the United States will advance our vital interests and pursue a free, open, prosperous, and secure world. We will leverage all elements of our national power to outcompete our strategic competitors; tackle shared challenges; and shape the rules of the road.

The Strategy is rooted in our national interests: to protect the security of the American people, to expand economic opportunity, and to realize and defend the democratic values at the heart of the American way of life. In pursuit of these objectives, we will:

  • Invest in the underlying sources and tools of American power and influence;
  • Build the strongest possible coalition of nations to enhance our collective influence to shape the global strategic environment and to solve shared challenges; and
  • Modernize and strengthen our military so it is equipped for the era of strategic competition.

COOPERATION IN THE AGE OF COMPETITION
In the early years of this decisive decade, the terms of geopolitical competition will be set while the window of opportunity to deal with shared challenges will narrow. We cannot compete successfully to shape the international order unless we have an affirmative plan to tackle shared challenges, and we cannot do that unless we recognize how heightened competition affects cooperation and act accordingly.

Strategic Competition. The most pressing strategic challenge we face as we pursue a free, open, prosperous, and secure world are from powers that layer authoritarian governance with a revisionist foreign policy.

  • We will effectively compete with the People’s Republic of China, which is the only competitor with both the intent and, increasingly, the capability to reshape the international order, while constraining a dangerous Russia.
  • Strategic competition is global, but we will avoid the temptation to view the world solely through a competitive lens, and engage countries on their own terms.

Shared Challenges. While this competition is underway, people all over the world are struggling to cope with the effects of shared challenges that cross borders—whether it is climate change, food insecurity, communicable diseases, or inflation. These shared challenges are not marginal issues that are secondary to geopolitics. They are at the very core of national and international security and must be treated as such.

  • We are building the strongest and broadest coalition of nations to enhance our collective capacity to solve these challenges and deliver for the American people and those around the world.
  • To preserve and increase international cooperation in an age of competition, we will pursue a dual-track approach. On one track, we will work with any country, including our competitors, willing to constructively address shared challenges within the rules-based international order and while working to strengthen international institutions. On the other track, we will deepen cooperation with democracies at the core of our coalition, creating a latticework of strong, resilient, and mutually reinforcing relationships that prove democracies can deliver for their people and the world.

INVESTING AT HOME
The Biden-Harris Administration has broken down the dividing line between domestic and foreign policy because our strength at home and abroad are inextricably linked. The challenges of our age, from strategic competition to climate change, require us to make investments that sharpen our competitive edge and bolster our resilience.

  • Our democracy is at the core of who we are and is a continuous work in progress. Our system of government enshrines the rule of law and strives to protect the equality and dignity of all individuals. As we strive to live up to our ideals, to reckon with and remedy our shortcomings, we will inspire others around the world to do the same.
  • We are complementing the innovative power of the private sector with a modern industrial strategy that makes strategic public investments in our workforce, strategic sectors, and supply chains, especially in critical and emerging technologies.
  • A powerful U.S. military helps advance and safeguard vital U.S. national interests by backstopping diplomacy, confronting aggression, deterring conflict, projecting strength, and protecting the American people and their economic interests. We are modernizing our military, pursuing advanced technologies, and investing in our defense workforce to best position America to defend our homeland, our allies, partners, and interests overseas, and our values across the globe.

OUR ENDURING LEADERSHIP
The United States will continue to lead with strength and purpose, leveraging our national advantages and the power of our alliances and partnerships. We have a tradition of transforming both domestic and foreign challenges into opportunities to spur reform and rejuvenation at home. The idea that we should compete with major autocratic powers to shape the international order enjoys broad support that is bipartisan at home and deepening abroad.

  • Our alliances and partnerships around the world are our most important strategic asset that we will deepen and modernize for the benefit of our national security.
  • We place a premium on growing the connective tissue on technology, trade and security between our democratic allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific and Europe because we recognize that they are mutually reinforcing and the fates of the two regions are intertwined.
  • We are charting new economic arrangements to deepen economic engagements with our partners and shaping the rules of the road to level the playing field and enable American workers and businesses—and those of partners and allies around the world—to thrive.
  • As we deepen our partnerships around the world, we will look for more democracy, not less, to shape the future. We recognize that while autocracy is at its core brittle, democracy’s inherent capacity to transparently course-correct enables resilience and progress.

AFFIRMATIVE ENGAGEMENT
The United States is a global power with global interests; we are stronger in each region because of our engagement in the others. We are pursuing an affirmative agenda to advance peace and security and to promote prosperity in every region.

  • As an Indo-Pacific power, the United States has a vital interest in realizing a region that is open, interconnected, prosperous, secure, and resilient. We are ambitious because we know that we and our allies and partners hold a common vision for the region’s future.
  • With a relationship rooted in shared democratic values, common interests, and historic ties, the transatlantic relationship is a vital platform on which many other elements of our foreign policy are built. To effectively pursue a common global agenda, we are broadening and deepening the transatlantic bond.
  • The Western Hemisphere directly impacts the United States more than any other region so we will continue to revive and deepen those partnerships to advance economic resilience, democratic stability, and citizen security.
  • A more integrated Middle East that empowers our allies and partners will advance regional peace and prosperity, while reducing the resource demands the region makes on the United States over the long term.
  • In Africa, the dynamism, innovation, and demographic growth of the region render it central to addressing complex global problems.

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