美中政策工作组新报告：美国对华政策备忘录

【编者按：近日，备受瞩目的美中政策工作组发布了今年的政策报告。中美印象翻译了该报告的执行摘要，以飨读者。今年的报告由著名的中国问题专家谢淑丽和前外交官华自强（Rick Waters）担任主笔，多位中国问题专家进行了评论。点击这里阅读报告的原文。】

美中政策工作组（Task Force on U.S.-China Policy）是一个由美国顶尖中国问题专家组成的联盟，以非党派方式分析和参与美中关系相关议题的讨论和研究。该工作组由亚洲协会美中关系中心（Asia Society’s Center on U.S.-China Relations） 和加州大学圣地亚哥分校21世纪中国中心（the University of California San Diego’s 21st Century China Center）召集，汇聚了来自全美的中国问题专家。该小组由夏伟（Orville Schell）和谢淑丽（Susan Shirk）共同担任主席，成员包括前美国政府官员、学者和智库研究员，其中许多人曾在尼克松政府以来的各界美国政府内担任高级职务。

执行摘要

在本政策备忘录中，我们提炼并综合了工作组成员在多次讨论中形成的关键见解。本文的建议旨在加强美国领导地位，维护经济和国家安全利益，并推动一项可持续的长期战略，以应对美中竞争。

1. 中国政府面临严重的自身国内问题，其程度比大多数外界人士所认识到的更为严峻。 尽管习近平依然坚定不移地推进在地缘政治野心、高科技自给自足以及政权安全方面方面的工作，但他仍有意愿稳定与美国的关系。中国的内部困难为双方在诸多双边问题上的谈判创造了机会。
2. 谈判可以从贸易和投资领域入手，并逐步扩展至更广泛的问题， 包括中国承担更大的地缘政治责任、对其亚洲邻国保持克制，以及减少对美国关键基础设施的干涉。阶梯式推进的方法比“一揽子协议”更可行。
3. 美国应采取分阶段、针对性的方式，结合经济压力与积极激励措施， 以在谈判中争取更大的杠杆作用，同时避免升级为贸易战。
4. 通过谈判向北京提供明确的选择，即“竞争性共存”还是“深化对抗”， 这一策略将引起中国国内许多人的共鸣，并增强美国在盟友、合作伙伴及其他国家中的影响力。当前的外交努力可以加大国内对习近平的压力，促使他调整政策、稳定美中关系，并为其继任者未来采取更加务实的路线奠定基础——即便他本人不愿如此。
5. 科技限制应基于风险评估，定期进行重新评估，并与美国及其盟友的利益保持一致。 吸引人才、高等教育合作和科技外交有助于提升美国竞争力。对投资和人才流动的限制应确保国家安全，同时避免削弱美国的技术优势或阻碍有益的科学合作。在美中谈判中，最复杂的挑战之一在于确定现有或未来的技术限制是否应纳入讨论范围。
6. 在解放军快速现代化的背景下，加强威慑能力和台湾目前处于弱势 的作战能力是当务之急。 美国在任何时候都不应暗示会放弃台湾或其他盟友，以换取与中国的任何协议。
7. 美国应加强与印太地区盟友在安全、经济和科技领域的合作， 同时在某些适当的区域事务上选择性地与中国接触。在与中国竞争的过程中，我们必须保持警惕，避免削弱美国的优势或降低全球地位。
8. 尽管美国政策不太可能改变解放军现代化的轨迹， 但近期的发展表明，中国可能愿意就有限的风险降低问题进行对话。
9. 中国在新疆、香港和西藏的政策及其为争取支持所做的努力，需要持续的对抗力量。虽然美国对中国的国内政策影响有限，但必须坚决反对其向境外输出威权主义做法的企图。

以下为该行政摘要的英文原文：

In this policy memo, we distill and synthesize key insights that emerged from many discussions among the Task Force members. The ensuing recommendations aim to reinforce American leadership, safeguard economic and national security interests, and promote a sustainable long-term strategy for managing U.S.-China competition.

1. The Chinese government faces significant self-inflicted domestic problems, which are more severe than most outsiders recognize. While Xi Jinping remains steadfast in his geopolitical ambitions, pursues high-tech self-sufficiency, and focuses on regime security, he has an interest in stabilizing relations with the U.S. China’s internal difficulties create opportunities for negotiation on various bilateral issues.
2. Negotiations can begin with trade and investment and extend step by step to broader issues including China’s assuming greater geopolitical responsibility, exercising restraint toward its Asian neighbors, and curbing interference with critical U.S. infrastructure. A laddered approach is more feasible than a “grand bargain.”
3. The U.S. should introduce economic pressure and positive incentives in a phased and targeted manner to achieve negotiating leverage while avoiding escalation to a trade war.
4. Negotiations that offer Beijing a clear choice between competitive coexistence and deepening contestation will resonate with many inside China and strengthen U.S. standing among allies, partners and other countries. Diplomatic initiatives taken now can increase internal pressure on Xi to moderate his policies, stabilize U.S.-China relations, and set the stage for his successors to pursue a more pragmatic course—even if he does not.
5. Technology restrictions should be risk-based, periodically reassessed, and aligned with U.S. interests and those of its allies. Attracting talents, higher education collaboration, and science diplomacy enhance U.S. competitiveness. Restrictions on investments and talent flows should take care to protect national security without eroding America’s technological edge or hindering beneficial scientific cooperation. One of the most complex challenges in U.S.-China negotiations is determining whether existing or future technology restrictions should be open for discussion.
6. Strengthening deterrence and Taiwan’s asymmetric capabilities is an urgent priority amid rapid PLA modernization. At no point should Washington suggest it would abandon Taiwan or other partners as part of any bargain with China.
7. The U.S. should increase security, economic, and technology collaboration with allies in the Indo-Pacific region, while selectively engaging China in some appropriate regional initiatives as 5 well. We must be vigilant not to squander U.S. advantages or weaken our global standing in our competition with China.
8. While U.S. policy is unlikely to alter the trajectory of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) modernization, recent developments suggest China may be open to limited discussions on risk reduction.
9. China’s policies in Xinjiang, Hong Kong, and Tibet, and its effort to build support for them, demand a sustained counterforce. While the U.S. has limited ability to influence China’s domestic policies, it must firmly oppose efforts to export authoritarian practices beyond China’s borders