关于朝核和萨德问题，美国学者一种有代表性的看法

作者：韩磊，史安妮来源：清华—卡内基全球政策中心网站

　　原题：《中方“萨德”问题的正解》（The Real Answer to China’s THAAD Dilemma）

　　报复韩国无济于事。要让韩国停止部署“萨德”系统，中国必须重新考虑其对朝政策。
　　Retaliation against South Korea won’t help. To stop THAAD, China must rethink its North Korea policy.

　　过去四年来，中朝关系一直在走下坡路。习近平当选中方领导人后即以向朝鲜派遣顾问团的名义向金正恩递交亲笔信，但朝方却以一系列举措“问候”中方领导人：2012年12月，朝鲜发射卫星，之后于2013年2月举行核试验，其时正值中国春节，亦是习近平首次召开党的全国代表大会前夕（原文如此——小编注）。此后朝方多次挑衅，让中方领导人（及中国人民）对中朝兄弟情谊深感失望。朝鲜继发射三枚弹道导弹将全球关注点引离中方举办的G20峰会后，上周又进行了第五次核试验，中朝关系由此雪上加霜。

　　Over the past four years, ties between Beijing and Pyongyang under the leaderships of Xi Jinping and Kim Jong-un have been on a one-way trajectory: down. While Xi sent a delegation of advisors to Pyongyang shortly after taking office to deliver a personal letter to the North Korean leader, Kim’s welcome greeting to his new Chinese counterpart featured a satellite rocket launch in December 2012 followed by a nuclear test in February 2013 during the Chinese New Year and on the eve of Xi Jinping’s first National Party Congress. The provocations marked the first of many that have disillusioned the Chinese leadership （and people） about their fraternal brothers in the North. When Pyongyang tested its fifth nuclear test last week, after having already stolen the world’s attention from China’s G20 limelight by firing three ballistic missiles, it only added insult to injury.

　　金正恩上台后，朝鲜对中方不断挑衅：处决中方最信赖的朝方对话人张成泽，进行第五次核试验，开发所谓“氢弹”，并罔顾中方力图叫停此类行动的高层外交努力，屡次开展远程导弹试验；此外，朝方最近试射二级固体燃料弹道导弹，极大加强了朝方导弹试验能力。面对朝鲜的恶劣行为，即便是中方领导有意与旧日盟友加强联系，也难以为再付出努力找到正当理由。

　　Under Kim Jong-un’s regime, North Korea has dealt China a steady stream of irritants: the execution of Jang Song-thaek, China’s most trusted North Korean interlocutor; a fifth nuclear test and the development of a so-called hydrogen bomb; multiple long-range missile tests, despite senior Chinese diplomatic efforts to halt them; and the testing of a two-stage, solid-fueled ballistic missile most recently, which adds significantly to the North’s missile program’s capabilities. Even a Chinese leader more inclined to pursue stronger relations with China’s traditional ally would have had trouble justifying such efforts in light of these egregious actions.

　　同一时期的中韩关系发展轨迹却与中朝截然不同。胡锦涛—李明博时期中韩关系一度恶化，习近平上任之初，中韩双边关系正处于相对低谷，中韩领导人建立了明确的人际关系，推动了中韩关系在广泛领域得到修缮。尽管习近平尚未同意与金正恩会谈，但中韩双方领导人仍于2013、2014年实现了国事互访。2015年12月，中韩签署新的自贸协定，韩国决定加入中方主导的亚投行，双方以此为契机深化了双边经济、贸易和商业联系。朴槿惠出席中方纪念二战胜利七十周年大阅兵，并于2015年9月与习近平进行首脑会晤，由此不难看出朴槿惠政府对中方的“倾斜”。

　　The course of China-South Korea relations over the same period, by contrast, has been nearly the inverse. Starting at a relative low point in bilateral ties following a deterioration of relations under the previous leaderships of Lee Myung-Bak and Hu Jintao, Xi Jinping and Park Geun-hye developed a palpable personal connection that lent momentum to a broader rapprochement. The leaders exchanged state visits to each other’s capitals in 2013 and 2014, despite the fact that Xi has not yet granted a meeting with Kim Jong-un. Both countries also advanced bilateral economic, trade, and commercial ties by signing a new free trade agreement in December 2015 and with South Korea’s decision to join the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank （AIIB）。 Park’s attendance at the Chinese military parade commemorating the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II – her sixth summit meeting with Xi — in September 2015 capped what some called a “tilt” by Park’s administration toward China.

　　不过，紧密的中韩关系尚未转到战略领域，而韩国的长期战略考量则是通过与中方建立更紧密关系来更有力地协调朝核问题。尽管中方在朝方第五次核试后同意“完整全面地加以执行”联合国安理会《第2270号决议》，但中方处理朝核扩散问题的做法仍显勉强。中方担心国际社会对朝惩罚措施会导致紧张局势升级或“金家王朝”垮台，而这并不符合中方利益，因此，中方多年来一直在对朝制裁和起草对朝决议上态度温和，并对上述决议的执行情况视而不见。此外，中方持续参与朝鲜经济事务，这一举动虽不一定违反联合国安理会有关决议，但削弱了多边对朝制裁的效果。

　　Yet the embrace between Seoul and Beijing has not transferred to the strategic arena, where South Korea has long hoped that closer relations with China would produce greater coordination on the North Korea nuclear issue. Despite agreeing to “full and complete implementation” of UN Resolution 2270 following North Korea’s fifth nuclear test, Beijing has remained a reluctant partner in addressing nuclear proliferation by the Kim regime. For many years, China has watered down sanctions and draft resolutions against North Korea, and turned a blind eye to lackadaisical enforcement of those resolutions out of fear that such punitive measures by the international community could spark escalation or lead to regime collapse in Pyongyang, which China does not see in its interests. Moreover, China’s sustained economic engagement with the North, though not necessarily a violation of UN resolutions, undermines the effectiveness of multilateral sanctions.

　　中方未能在处理朝核问题上取得实质进展，意味着朝鲜核武器及弹道导弹实力不断增强。因此，韩美今年7月联合宣布将于明年底完成美国末端高空区域防御系统（“萨德”）部署以提高韩国应对朝鲜威胁的能力，这一决定不足为奇。美方向中方强调，部署“萨德”旨在“直接回应朝方核武及导弹计划威胁”，且“萨德”系“纯防御措施……不针对除朝鲜外的任一第三国，也不会威胁中方安全利益”。

　　The failure to make progress on addressing the North Korea nuclear issue has meant that the country’s nuclear weapons and ballistic missile capabilities have continued to mount. Thus, it was little surprise in July when South Korea and the United States jointly announced that they would deploy the U.S. defense system Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense （THAAD） by the end of next year in order to enhance South Korea’s capability to meet North Korea’s threat. U.S. leaders have emphasized to their Chinese counterparts that the decision to deploy THAAD was made “directly in response to the threat posed by North Korea in its nuclear and missile programs” and was “ purely a defensive measure… not aimed at any other party other than North Korea… nor capable of threatening China’s security interests.”

　　但中方认为部署“萨德”是美方实现在亚太地区包围中国这一计划的一部分。尽管中方缺乏证据，但仍坚称“萨德”会损害中方核威慑实力，且现有爱国者PAC-3反导系统足以保护韩国不受朝鲜导弹威胁。中方认定防御中俄才是美方部署“萨德”的真实意图。韩美就“萨德”展开合作表明中方眼中唯美“马首是瞻”的韩国通过构建区域反导系统增强反制中方战略武器，将破坏亚洲总体战略平衡的实力。

　　Beijing, however, views the deployment as part of a broader effort to encircle China in the Asia Pacific. Despite evidence to the contrary, China contends that THAAD would undermine China’s nuclear deterrent capability and that the existing Patriot PAC-3 missile defense system is capable of protecting South Korea from Pyongyang’s missile threats. China therefore sees the true aim of THAAD deployment to be China as well as Russia. South Korea’s cooperation with the United States on the system implicates Seoul in what China views as a U.S. subplot to establish a regional anti-missile system, enhance U.S. capabilities against Chinese strategic weapons, and undermine the overall strategic equilibrium in Asia.

　　基于对美韩部署“萨德”意图及其威胁的评估，中方采取了一系列报复措施：中方取消了若干韩国明星的在华演唱会及部分韩国影视剧，导致一些行业领先的娱乐公司收入锐减；中方媒体猜测中方已撤销赴大陆韩国游客的签证；中国海军宣布增强中方现有反导实力的可能举措。中方外长王毅就此总结道：“韩方当前行为破坏了中韩互信基础”。尽管过去中韩互信日益加深，合作日益深化，但上述举措仍可能导致中韩关系跌至历史最低点。

　　Based on China’s assessment of the intentions of THAAD deployment and the threat it poses, the leadership in Beijing has begun to take retaliatory steps. China canceled several Korean pop concerts and television dramas in China, sending the stocks of some of the top entertainment companies into sharp decline. Chinese media reported on speculation that China had revoked visas for South Korean tourists visiting the Mainland. And the Chinese Air Force announced a possible move to enhance the capabilities of the country’s existing anti-missile capabilities. Foreign Minister Wang Yi summarized by saying, “the recent behavior from South Korea has undermined the foundation for our bilateral trust.” The end result could set back China-ROK relations to the lowest point in either leader’s tenure, despite the growing trust and cooperation that had been achieved.

　　中方学者在美韩宣布部署“萨德”后力倡中方采取更极端的举措，即中方不仅应采取强硬措施制裁韩国，包括制裁与“萨德”相关的韩国企业、服务业及积极支持部署“萨德”的韩方政客，还应重新评估对朝制裁。他们提议解放军应增强中方自主反导实力以最大程度削弱“萨德”实力，并强化对俄关系。中方部分人士认为，放松对朝制裁并寻求修复、发展对朝关系是中方对韩国部署“萨德”的合理回应。

　　A more extreme contingent of Chinese scholars has emerged in the aftermath of the THAAD announcement advocating that China not only take strong steps to punish South Korea, including sanctions on THAAD-affiliated Korean companies, services, and the politicians who actively supported its deployment, but also should also reevaluate sanctions against North Korea. They have proposed that the PLA should enhance China’s own anti-missile capabilities in order to minimize THAAD’s capabilities and deepen cooperation with Russia. For some in China, a reasonable response to South Korea’s deployment of THAAD would be to loosen sanctions on the North and look to repair and develop ties with Pyongyang.

　　有一种观点认为，目前韩美部署“萨德”让中方陷入零和安全困局，中方只能在保卫自身安全和推进与手握“萨德”炮台的韩国的建设性关系两者中选其一。这种观点有导向性错误，这一“抉择困局”更是无从谈起。

　　It is misleading, however, to say that the deployment of THAAD now presents China with a zero-sum security dilemma in which it must choose between either safeguarding its security or advancing constructive relations with a South Korea that hosts a THAAD battery. This is a false choice.

　　朝核问题威胁了包括中国在内的这一地区的各国安全，遏制朝核野心的举措均以失败告终，故韩美决定在韩部署“萨德”系统。朝核实力发展让中方维护半岛稳定的相关努力付诸东流，而朝方日益成为中方的“负担”，甚至“负债”，损害了中方从朝方这一“战略缓冲”中所获的利益——“萨德”系统的部署就是一个佐证。在中方对朝政策及其区域外交遭遇重大挫折的背景下，中方应重新审视其解决朝鲜半岛问题的方法。毕竟无论对韩采取经济报复措施，还是缓和对朝制裁，都无助于强化半岛战略稳定及安全。

　　The decision by the United States and South Korea to deploy THAAD in South Korea is a consequence of the collective failure to constrain Pyongyang’s nuclear ambitions, which threaten all countries in the region, including most certainly China. Pyongyang’s nuclear developments have offset Beijing’s efforts to safeguard stability on the Peninsula. Increasingly, North Korea is becoming a burden, even a liability, for China—eroding the benefits of the strategic buffer that it provides. The decision to deploy THAAD is a case in point. In the context of this significant setback for China’s North Korea policy and its regional diplomacy, China needs to review its approach to the Korean Peninsula, because neither economic retaliation against the South nor loosening sanctions against the North will enhance regional strategic stability and security.

　　面对新一届美国政府，习近平面临两个选择。一是继续容忍金正恩一以贯之的对华挑衅及蔑视，这不但威胁中方自身安全，且会招致美国更大规模的介入及其在亚太地区与其盟友开展更进一步的军事活动；二是与韩、美及其他各方展开合作，对朝施加更大压力，终止朝方恶意举措。各国都免不了常常面对利益冲突，而国家领导人如何在利益冲突中作出抉择，道出了这个国家的方方面面。中方一味“袒护”朝方目前已远远弊大于利，中方的抉择应该是明朗的了。

　　The real choice facing Xi Jinping as he approaches a new U.S. administration is whether to continue to tolerate Kim Jong-un’s stubborn belligerence and defiance, which threatens the security of China and will result in greater U.S. military presence and more advanced U.S. alliance activities in the Asia-Pacific, or to employ greater pressure to stop North Korean bad behavior, working alongside South Korea, the United States, and other parties. Countries are often faced with competing interests and how leaders choose between those competing interests tells you a lot about that country. The costs of China’s coddling of North Korea now far outweigh the benefits. For China, the choice is clear.

　　作者：韩磊（Paul Haenle），清华—卡内基全球政策中心的主任，曾在美国国家安全委员会担任主管中国、台湾和蒙古事务的主任；

　　史安妮（Anne Sherman），乔治城大学外交事务学院亚洲事务研究方向硕士，曾任清华—卡内基全球政策中心主任韩磊的研究助理；

　　本文来源：本文中文版9月12日发表于清华—卡内基全球政策中心网站，英文版发表在《外交官》网站。